Capital punishment is the taking of a human life by a government in response to a crime committed by that convict. See arguments for and against. Open access academic research from top universities on the subject of Criminal Law. Следовательно, должны быть выбраны такое наказания и такие способы нанесения их, которые произведут самые сильные и неизгладимые впечатления на умы других людей, с наименьшей мукой для преступника. Суд может наложить штраф. Смело включайте детективы в оригинале и наслаждайтесь! ❣ Привет, ребят! 👉 В прошлый раз мы разобрали различные преступления на английском, а теперь. наказание, предусмотрено различной степени тяжести, в соответствии с совершенным преступлением!
Punishment – наказание
Перевод ПОЛУЧИЛ НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский: get the punishment, get detention, receive the punishment, get him, gets punished. наказание, предусмотрено различной степени тяжести, в соответствии с совершенным преступлением! Перевод слова НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский язык, смотреть в русско-английском словаре.
Перевод "наказание" на английский
/ Перевод на английский "наказание". 1. (noun) A lazy cowboy who neglects their duties on a farm or ranch. 2. (noun) A rural person in an urban environment, such as an office, who's mannersisms are notably different, less competitive, and often performed at a slower pace than the urbanites. The term may be used in either an endearing or. Следовательно, должны быть выбраны такое наказания и такие способы нанесения их, которые произведут самые сильные и неизгладимые впечатления на умы других людей, с наименьшей мукой для преступника. punishment, penalty, chastisement, judgment, discipline, penance, plague. Legal Punishment. First published Tue Jan 2, 2001; substantive revision Fri Dec 10, 2021. The question of whether, and how, legal punishment can be justified has long been a central concern of legal, moral, and political philosophy: what could justify a state in using the apparatus of the law to inflict.
Punishment - произношение, транскрипция, перевод
He beat up an innocent man... Скопировать Ты знаешь, мы с ним не разговариваем. Это часть его наказания. Как ты можешь часами сидеть и слушать это? How can you just sit here hour after hour and listen to that? Скопировать — Школьный лагерь. Тони, у них там разрешены телесные наказания. Школьный психолог Вито рассказывыал мне про эти лагеря.
Они расположены в штатах Юта и Айдахо, потому что там закон разрешает бить детей. Tony, they allow corporal punishment. Ёто действительно изобретательно! Torturing each other! You wanna hear a really cool torture that the romans invented? They also used it as a form of capital punishment!
Yeah, rowdy is a great word. It is fun to watch. And very noisy. They insult each other. They get emotional. And they boo and make noise. A lot of parliaments do have... But some parliaments people get physical. Well, of course, you have the famous video of Жириновский throwing water at people. That was so fun. Did you see that video? He had a disagreement with another person and he threw water. Yeah, it was probably over the retaking of Alaska. Yeah, but that was funny. It was quite the scene. So why do people commit crimes? Oh, for many reasons. Out of. Well, I do not know. Out of spite, out of hatred. Some people do it out of. Out of addiction sometimes. So when people steal because they need, they want a dose of something like that. There is so, so, so, so, so many reasons. Well, this is a really big general question about to throw down here. You spoke about addictions. I mean, some people would do it because of their mental health, you know, mental illness, maybe especially, you know, if you look at the history of all those like serial killers and everything, they knew what they were doing. But why? This is a big question still. Like what was driving them? And some of them wanted to be studied here. But another reason is gangs that would be a part of their initiation, being part of it. Would you like to be part of a gang? Thank you. Humans have a tribal instinct. Like you want to belong. Then, yeah, you need to have a family. Well, I was going to ask the big question, I was going to throw down is, do you think that drugs should be legalized or made illegal? Because they cause so many crimes? Well, addictions lead to many crimes. I believe, yes. So but... Go on. I was I was going to ask you, what are your feelings about the way that they legalized some drugs in the US? And so I just. And it kind of concerns me a little bit that they post like, Oh, how to find out if this is a good drug and how to help a person who has overdosed and everything? And not only was like not only about marijuana but about meth, about fentanyl. England and America. You do this, this and this. Like you said. A definitely England and America with many, many, many drug addicts in both our countries. Yeah, and in Russia, like obviously they have stricter laws with regards to drugs. Well, Portugal has completely decriminalized all drugs, heroin, crack, everything. And this has been the case since the year 2000. And then we have our so-called war on drugs. And that has been people are really against this thing that has not worked. So, you know. They put in a lot more money in the prison system than the education at one point. Do we really want to fill up our prisons with these, you know, low level drug crimes? And I can really see that point. I can understand that. But and at one point, I was definitely for it. What are you going to say? I mean, but how... Is the law morality or is the law something else...
Новостях и Дзене. Все главные и интересные новости тут.
Тяжкое наказание. Налагать на кого нибудь наказание. Заслужить наказание. Подвергнуться наказанию за что… … Толковый словарь Ушакова наказание — телесное, строгое, легкое, исправительное, уголовное , взыскание, кара, казнь, пеня, расправа, штраф, эпитимия. Ср … Словарь синонимов Наказание — Любая реакция, следующая за определенным событием и уменыпающая вероятность возникновения этого события в будущем. К примеру, если ребенка бранят каждый раз, когда он кормит собаку едой со стола, то в конце концов он прекратит это делать.
Жизель Бюндхен разрыдалась из-за полицейского, выписавшего ей штраф на дороге
Ваш организм оказывается в состоянии хронического стресса. Другие возможные побочные эффекты включают страх, агрессию и потерю чувствительности, проблемы с ростом клеток волос, костей, неустойчивость к инфекциям. News increases cognitive errors. News feeds the mother of all cognitive errors: confirmation bias. In the words of Warren Buffett: «What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact. We become prone to overconfidence, take stupid risks and misjudge opportunities. It also exacerbates another cognitive error: the story bias. Any journalist who writes, «The market moved because of X» or «the company went bankrupt because of Y» is an idiot.
I am fed up with this cheap way of «explaining» the world. Новости искажают реальные факты усиливают ошибки восприятия Поток новостей — отец всех когнитивных ошибок: жажды подтверждения. Мы становимся излишне самоуверенными, глупо рискуем и недооцениваем возможности. Наш мозг жаждет историй, которые «имеют смысл», даже если они не соответствуют действительности. Любой журналист, который пишет, что «рынок существует благодаря X» или «компания обанкротилась из-за Y», — идиот. Мы сыты по горло этим дешевым способом «объяснения» мира. News inhibits thinking.
Thinking requires concentration. Concentration requires uninterrupted time. News pieces are specifically engineered to interrupt you. They are like viruses that steal attention for their own purposes. News makes us shallow thinkers. News severely affects memory. There are two types of memory.
The path from short-term to long-term memory is a choke-point in the brain, but anything you want to understand must pass through it. If this passageway is disrupted, nothing gets through. Because news disrupts concentration, it weakens comprehension. Online news has an even worse impact. News is an intentional interruption system. Новости подавляют мышление Мышление требует концентрации. Концентрация требует непрерывного времени.
Новости специально разработаны, чтобы прерывать вас. Они похожи на вирусы, которые крадут ваше внимание для своих целей. Новости уменьшают количество думающих людей. Новости серьезно влияют на память. Так как новости нарушают концентрацию, они ослабляют понимание. Есть два типа памяти. Долгосрочная память имеет практические неисчерпаемый объем.
Но короткосрочная оперативная память ограничена определенным объемом поступающей информации. ТО, что вы хотите понять и осознать, должно пройти путь в долгосрочную память из короткосрочной. Если фильтр забит, то по-настоящему важная информация не сможет через него пробиться. Новости снижают нашу концентрацию на важном.
The fear of death is more effective than the fear of prison.
If we put them in prison, they can escape and commit another crime. It is cruel and inhumane. People have been sentenced to death and later it was discovered that they were completely innocent. The poor and defenceless are more likely to be executed than the rich and powerful. And what do you think about it?
From Speak Out 4, 1998 Смертная казнь В демократических странах существуют споры: как общество должно наказывать убийц? Или террористов? Или похитителей? В некоторых странах смертная казнь была отменена. Но она все еще используется в других.
Согласно статье, вандалу грозит административный штраф от трех до десяти тысяч рублей или обязательные работы на срок 160 часов. Также ему могут запретить посещение спортивных соревнований на срок от 6 месяцев до 3 лет. Во время встречи была выяснена личность вандала, после чего его вывели с трибун и передали правоохранительным органам.
One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations.
Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values. A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert.
Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012. Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment.
Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch.
This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions.
For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017.
A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019.
Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch.
For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73.
One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will.
In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e.
See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism.
For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find.
An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens.
The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986.
A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012.
For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment.
Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch.
For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H. Morris 1981 and Hampton 1984; for a more recent account, see Demetriou 2012; for criticism, see Deigh 1984, Shafer-Landau 1991. But education theorists also take seriously the Hegelian worry discussed earlier; they view punishment not as a means of conditioning people to behave in certain ways, but rather as a means of teaching them that what they have done should not be done because it is morally wrong.
Thus although the education view sets offender reform as an end, it also implies certain nonconsequentialist constraints on how we may appropriately pursue this end. Another distinctive feature of the moral education view is that it conceives of punishment as aiming to confer a benefit on the offender: the benefit of moral education. Critics have objected to the moral education view on various grounds, however. Some are sceptical about whether punishment is the most effective means of moral education. Others deny that most offenders need moral education; many offenders realise what they are doing is wrong but are weak-willed, impulsive, etc. Each of the theories discussed in this section incorporates, in various ways, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements.
Whether any of these is more plausible than pure consequentialist or pure retributivist alternatives is, not surprisingly, a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. One possibility, of course, is that none of the theories on offer is successful because punishment is, ultimately, unjustifiable. The next section considers penal abolitionism. Abolition and Alternatives Abolitionist theorising about punishment takes many different forms, united only by the insistence that we should seek to abolish, rather than merely to reform, our practices of punishment. Classic abolitionist texts include Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994. An initial question is precisely what practices should be abolished.
Some abolitionists focus on particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment see, e.
Наказание - перевод с русского на английский
The English Heritage collection that is archiving lost London. From door knockers to dado rails, the Architectural Study Collection has more than 7,000 items gathered from London buildings — and it is opening for public tours this year. 5. Criminal justice and criminal proceedings перевод на Русский Изучай английский с помощью книг, фильмов и подкастов из интернета. Субтитры, возможность мгновенного перевода, сохранения новых слов одним кликом и множество интересных разделов – все это в Джунглях! наказание, предусмотрено различной степени тяжести, в соответствии с совершенным преступлением! Английский перевод штраф или наказание – Русский-Английский Словарь и поисковая система, английский перевод.
Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском.
Русско-английский словарь. Перевод «Наказание». на английский язык: «punishment». Власти Великобритании ужесточат наказание за нарушение закона о шпионаже, увеличив срок до пожизненного заключения, сообщает The Daily Telegraph со ссылкой на главу британского МВД Прити Пател. НАКАЗАНИЕ — НАКАЗАНИЕ, наказания, ср. 1. Взыскание, налагаемое имеющим право, власть или силу, на того, кто совершил преступление или проступок; кара. онлайн новости последнего часа Подбор самых актуальных новостей на сегодня. Legal Punishment. First published Tue Jan 2, 2001; substantive revision Fri Dec 10, 2021. The question of whether, and how, legal punishment can be justified has long been a central concern of legal, moral, and political philosophy: what could justify a state in using the apparatus of the law to inflict. Перевод слова НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский язык, смотреть в русско-английском словаре.