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Перевод "наказание" на английский
In fact, Lizaveta gave her a cross and a copy of the Gospels. She passionately reads to him the story of the raising of Lazarus from the Gospel of John. His fascination with her, which had begun at the time when her father spoke of her, increases and he decides that they must face the future together. As he leaves he tells her that he will come back tomorrow and tell her who killed her friend Lizaveta. When Raskolnikov presents himself for his interview, Porfiry resumes and intensifies his insinuating, provocative, ironic chatter, without ever making a direct accusation. Back at his room Raskolnikov is horrified when the old artisan suddenly appears at his door. He had been one of those present when Raskolnikov returned to the scene of the murders, and had reported his behavior to Porfiry. The atmosphere deteriorates as guests become drunk and the half-mad Katerina Ivanovna engages in a verbal attack on her German landlady. With chaos descending, everyone is surprised by the sudden and portentous appearance of Luzhin. He sternly announces that a 100-ruble banknote disappeared from his apartment at the precise time that he was being visited by Sonya, whom he had invited in order to make a small donation. Sonya fearfully denies stealing the money, but Luzhin persists in his accusation and demands that someone search her.
The mood in the room turns against Sonya, Luzhin chastises her, and the landlady orders the family out. Luzhin is discredited, but Sonya is traumatized, and she runs out of the apartment. Raskolnikov follows her. But it is only a prelude to his confession that he is the murderer of the old woman and Lizaveta. Painfully, he tries to explain his abstract motives for the crime to uncomprehending Sonya. She is horrified, not just at the crime, but at his own self-torture, and tells him that he must hand himself in to the police. Lebezyatnikov appears and tells them that the landlady has kicked Katerina Ivanovna out of the apartment and that she has gone mad. They find Katerina Ivanovna surrounded by people in the street, completely insane, trying to force the terrified children to perform for money, and near death from her illness. Svidrigailov has been residing next door to Sonya, and overheard every word of the murder confession. Part 6 edit Razumikhin tells Raskolnikov that Dunya has become troubled and distant after receiving a letter from someone.
As Raskolnikov is about to set off in search of Svidrigailov, Porfiry himself appears and politely requests a brief chat. He sincerely apologises for his previous behavior and seeks to explain the reasons behind it. Strangely, Raskolnikov begins to feel alarmed at the thought that Porfiry might think he is innocent. He claims that he will be arresting him soon, but urges him to confess to make it easier on himself. Raskolnikov chooses to continue the struggle.
It might of course turn out that answers to all these questions will flow from a single theoretical foundation — for instance, from a unitary consequentialist principle specifying the good that punishment should achieve, or from some version of the retributivist principle that the sole proper aim of punishment is to impose on the guilty the punitive burdens they deserve.
But matters might not be as simple as that: we might find that quite different and conflicting values are relevant to different issues about punishment, and that any complete normative account of punishment will have to find a place for these values and offer guidance in how to resolve tensions among them when they conflict see s. But it is an illegitimate assumption: normative theorists must be open to the possibility, startling and disturbing as it might be, that this pervasive human practice cannot be justified. We will attend to some abolitionist arguments in section 7. Even if those arguments can be met, even if legal punishment can be justified, at least in principle, the abolitionist challenge is one that must be met, rather than ignored; and it will help to remind us of the ways in which any practice of legal punishment is bound to be morally problematic. Punishment, Crime, and the State Legal punishment presupposes crime as that for which punishment is imposed, and a criminal law as that which defines crimes as crimes; a system of criminal law presupposes a state, which has the political authority to make and enforce the law and to impose punishments. A normative account of legal punishment and its justification must thus at least presuppose, and should perhaps make explicit, a normative account of the criminal law why should we have a criminal law at all?
See generally Duff 2018: ch. Recent scholarship has thus seen a growing interest in grounding analysis of the justification of punishment in a political theory of the state. Several others are based on versions of republicanism see Pettit 1997; Duff 2001; Dagger 2007 and 2011a; Yankah 2015; for other recent contributions showing the importance of political theory, see Brudner 2009; Brooks 2011; Sigler 2011; Markel 2012; Chiao 2016 and 2018. How far it matters, in this context, to make explicit a political theory of the state depends on how far different plausible political theories will generate different accounts of how punishment can be justified and should be used. We cannot pursue this question here for two sharply contrasting views on it, see Philips 1986; M. Davis 1989 , save to note one central point.
For any political theory that takes seriously the idea of citizenship as full membership of the polity, the problem of punishment takes a particularly acute form, since we have now to ask how punishment can be consistent with citizenship how citizens can legitimately punish each other : if we are not to say that those who commit crimes thereby forfeit their status as citizens see s. Before we tackle such theories of punishment, however, we should look briefly at the concept of crime, since that is one focus of the abolitionist critique of punishment. On a simple positivist view of law, crimes are kinds of conduct that are prohibited, on pain of threatened sanctions, by the law; and for positivists such as Bentham, who combine positivism with a normative consequentialism, the questions of whether we should maintain a criminal law at all, and of what kinds of conduct should be criminalised, are to be answered by trying to determine whether and when this method of controlling human conduct is likely to produce a net increase in good. For the criminal law portrays crime not merely as conduct which has been prohibited, but as a species of wrongdoing: whether our inquiry is analytical into the concept of crime or normative as to what kinds of conduct, if any, should be criminal , we must therefore focus on that notion of wrongdoing. Crimes are, at least, socially proscribed wrongs — kinds of conduct that are condemned as wrong by some purportedly authoritative social norm. Tort law, for instance, deals in part with wrongs that are non-private in that they are legally and socially declared as wrongs — with the wrong constituted by libel, for instance.
She must decide to bring, or not to bring, a civil case against the person who wronged her; and although she can appeal to the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the defendant. Morris 1968: 477—80; Murphy 1973; Dagger 1993 and 2008 ; or they undermine the trust on which social life depends Dimock 1997. But such accounts distract our attention from the wrongs done to the individual victims that most crimes have, when it is those wrongs that should be our central concern: we should condemn the rapist or murderer, we should see the wrong he has done as our concern, because of what he has done to his victim. One can of course count a criminal conviction as a kind of punishment: but it does not entail the kind of materially burdensome punishment, imposed after conviction, with which penal theorists are primarily concerned. More plausibly, the abolitionist claim could be that rather than take wrongdoing as our focus, we should focus on the harm that has been done, and on how it can be repaired; we will return to this suggestion in section 7 below. Now it is a familiar and disturbing truth that our existing criminal processes — both in their structure and in their actual operations — tend to preclude any effective participation by either victims or offenders, although an adequate response to the criminal wrong that was done should surely involve them both.
Faced, for instance, by feuding neighbours who persistently accuse each other of more or less trivial wrongs, it might indeed be appropriate to suggest that they should forget about condemning each other and look for a way of resolving their conflict. So, we must turn now to the question of what could justify such a system of punishment. Consequentialist Accounts Many people, including those who do not take a consequentialist view of other matters, think that any adequate justification of punishment must be basically consequentialist. For we have here a practice that inflicts, indeed seeks to inflict, significant hardship or burdens: how else could we hope to justify it than by showing that it brings consequential benefits sufficiently large to outweigh, and thus to justify, those burdens? However, when we try to flesh out this simple consequentialist thought into something closer to a full normative account of punishment, problems begin to appear. A consequentialist must justify punishment if she is to justify it at all as a cost-effective means to certain independently identifiable goods for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker 1991.
Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in reducing crime we will thus be reducing the harms that crime causes. It is commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders though for an argument that incapacitation is not a genuinely punitive aim, see Hoskins 2016: 260. There are of course other goods that a system of punishment can bring. It can reassure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them—though this is a good that, in a well-informed society, will be achieved only insofar as the more immediate preventive goods are achieved. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see wrongdoers suffer — though to show that to be a genuine good, rather than merely a means of averting vigilantism and private revenge, we would need to show that it involves something more than mere vengeance, which would be to make sense of some version of retributivism.
In consequentialist terms, punishment will be justified if it is an effective means of achieiving its aim, if its benefits outweigh its costs, and if there is no less burdensome means of achieving the same aim. It is a contingent question whether punishment can satisfy these conditions, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot — that there are more effective and less burdensome methods of crime reduction see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968; Golash 2005: chs. Our focus here, however, will be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment — objections, basically, that crime-reductive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment. The most familiar line of objection to consequentialist penal theories contends that consequentialists would be committed to regarding manifestly unjust punishments the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty to be in principle justified if they would efficiently serve the aim of crime reduction: but such punishments would be wrong, because they would be unjust see e. There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this objection. Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable see e.
Another objection to consequentialist accounts focuses not on potential wrongs done to the innocent but rather on the wrong allegedly done to the guilty. Consequentialist punishment, on this objection, fails to respect the person punished as an autonomous moral agent. In Kantian terms, such punishment treats those punished as mere means to achieving some social good, rather than respecting them as ends in themselves Kant 1797: 473; Murphy 1973. One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations.
Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values. A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert.
Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012. Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment.
Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch.
This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions.
For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017.
A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019.
Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch.
For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73.
One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will.
In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e.
See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism.
For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find.
An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence.
Продолжай в том же духе, и получишь наказание! Чтобы этого вновь не повторилось все четверо получат наказание. Ты хочешь получить наказание прямо сейчас? Do I have to begin the punishment now? И если даже окружной прокурор признает его виновным, что не гарантировано насильник получит наказание от силы 11 месяцев а Вы знаете, что это половина наказания за неуплату налогов. And even if the DA gets a conviction which is not guaranteed the rapist can serve as little as 11 months you know which is half the time you get for tax evasion.
Ты хочешь получить наказание прямо сейчас? Do I have to begin the punishment now? И если даже окружной прокурор признает его виновным, что не гарантировано насильник получит наказание от силы 11 месяцев а Вы знаете, что это половина наказания за неуплату налогов. And even if the DA gets a conviction which is not guaranteed the rapist can serve as little as 11 months you know which is half the time you get for tax evasion. Что я получу наказание за мои действия? That I accept the consequences of my actions?
Наказание — перевод на английский
Так что видите, наказание действовало. Which is the most severe punishment? Что является наиболее тяжелым наказанием? This would be an administrative punishment. Это и было бы для них административным наказанием. That is cruel and unusual punishment. Это очень жестокое и необычное наказание. Ты напрашиваешься на наказание. Это жестокое и необычное наказание.
Just punishment is the best deterrent. Справедливое наказание — это наилучший способ сдерживания.
Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s. International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law. But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues. Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole.
Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010. For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone.
Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch. For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid.
To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e. In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories. There are also widely documented burdensome consequences of a conviction to the family members or loved ones of those who are convicted, and to their communities. These sorts of informal consequences of criminal convictions appear less likely than the formal legal consequences to constitute legal punishment, insofar as they are not intentionally imposed by the state but see Kolber 2012.
Still, the informal collateral consequences of a conviction are arguably relevant to theorising about punishment, and we should examine when, if ever, such burdens are relevant to sentencing determinations on sentencing, see s. Further Issues A number of further important questions are relevant to theorising about punishment, which can only be noted here. First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries? What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence? Considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to these questions see e. Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice — between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified — that the abolitionist challenge can be met. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect — that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified see Heffernan and Kleinig 2000.
If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, while also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices that perpetrate serious injustice see Murphy 1973; Duff 2001, ch. Finally, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual system of punishment unjust ified might be not its own operations as such what punishment is or achieves within that system , but the absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the whole system depends for its legitimacy see Duff 2001, ch. Recent scholarship on punishment has increasingly acknowledged that the justification of punishment depends on the justification of the criminal law more generally, and indeed the legitimacy of the state itself see s. For example, if the state passes laws criminalising conduct that is not justifiably prohibited, then this calls into question the justification of the punishment it imposes for violations of these laws. Similarly, if the procedures by which criminal justice officials apprehend, charge, and prosecute individuals are unjustified, then the subsequent inflictions of punishment will be unjustified as well see Ristroph 2015 and 2016; on specific aspects of criminal procedure, see, e. Bibliography Primoratz 1999, Honderich 2005, Ellis 2012, and Brooks 2013 are useful introductory books.
Duff and Garland 1994; Ashworth, von Hirsch; and Roberts 2009; and Tonry 2011 are useful collections of readings. Adelsberg, L. Guenther, and S. Adler, J. Alexander, L. Allais, L. Altman, A. Altman, M. Anderson, J.
Ardal, P. Ashworth, A. Roberts eds. Duff and S. Zedner, and P. Tomlin eds. Bagaric, M. Baker, B. Cragg ed.
Barnett, R. Becker, L. Bennett, C. Flanders and Z. Hoskins eds. Bentham, J. Berman, M. Green eds. Bianchi, H.
Bickenbach, J. Boonin, D. Bottoms, A. Ashworth and M. Wasik eds. Braithwaite, J. Tonry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 241—367. Brettschneider, C. Brooks, T.
Brown, J. Brownlee, K. Brudner, A. Burgh, R. Caruso, G. Chau, P. Chiao, V. Christie, N. British Journal of Criminology, 17: 1—15.
Ciocchetti, C. Cogley, Z. Timpe and C. Boyd eds. Cottingham, J. Dagger, R. Laborde and J. Maynor eds. Daly, K.
Davidovic, J. Davis, A. New York: Seven Stories Press. Davis, L. Davis, M. Deigh, J. Demetriou, D. Dempsey, M. Dimock, S.
Dolinko, D. Dolovich, S. Drumbl, M. Duff, R. Besson and J. Tasioulas eds. Green and B. Leiter eds. Garland eds.
Подобные файлы могут спровоцировать эпилептические припадки и наносят людям серьезный физический и психологический ущерб. Закон получил такое название благодаря мальчику Заку, который в восьмилетнем возрасте в социальной сети X ранее Twitter начал кампанию по сбору средств для благотворительной организации Epilepsy Society. В комментариях к сообщениям некоторые люди начали оставлять фото и GIF-файлы с мерцающим эффектом, в результате чего несколько человек сообщили о возникновении припадков. Рассказать друзьям.
Years of dead end jobs and poor diet have made white, middle aged men very upset. Although a term of mockery, Gravy SEALs should be taken seriously, as they are deluded AND have access to copious amounts of arms, and plenty of just as delusional friends to back them up. They may be fat, unhealthy, conspiracy nuts, but they have real guns.
18 U.S. Code Part I - CRIMES
The two most common penalties that Appeals may remove abate are penalties that can have a reasonable cause: Failure to file Failure to pay Reasonable cause is relief IRS may grant when a taxpayer exercises ordinary business care and prudence in determining their tax obligations but is unable to comply with those obligations due to circumstances beyond their control. The IRS can also remove abate penalties because of certain statutory exceptions and administrative waivers.
За вмешательство в выборы и кражу гостайны, согласно законопроекту, в Соединённом Королевстве планируют установить наказание в виде 14 лет лишения свободы. Министр юстиции и генеральный прокурор Польши Збигнев Зебро в марте заявил, что польские власти намерены усилить ответственность за шпионаж. Он пояснил, что меры в Уголовном кодексе Польши несовершенны, так как в среднем наказание за шпионаж в Польше составляет четыре года.
He looks for news about the murder, and seems almost to want to draw attention to his own part in it. He returns to the scene of the crime and re-lives the sensations he experienced at the time. He angers the workmen and caretakers by asking casual questions about the murder, even suggesting that they accompany him to the police station to discuss it. As he contemplates whether or not to confess, he sees Marmeladov, who has been struck mortally by a carriage. Upon entering his room Raskolnikov is deeply shocked to see his mother and sister sitting on the sofa. They have just arrived in Petersburg and are ecstatic to see him, but Raskolnikov is unable to speak, and collapses in a faint. Part 3 edit Razumikhin tends to Raskolnikov, and manages to convince the distressed mother and sister to return to their apartment. When they return the next morning Raskolnikov has improved physically, but it becomes apparent that he is still mentally distracted and merely forcing himself to endure the meeting. He demands that Dunya break with Luzhin, but Dunya fiercely defends her motives for the marriage. Mrs Raskolnikova has received a note from Luzhin demanding that her son not be present at any future meetings between them. He also informs her that he witnessed her son give the 25 rubles to "an unmarried woman of immoral behavior" Sonya. Dunya has decided that a meeting, at which both Luzhin and her brother are present, must take place, and Raskolnikov agrees to attend that evening along with Razumikhin. As she leaves, Raskolnikov asks for her address and tells her that he will visit her soon. Raskolnikov immediately senses that Porfiry knows that he is the murderer. Porfiry, who has just been discussing the case with Zamyotov, adopts an ironic tone during the conversation. An appointment is made for an interview the following morning at the police bureau. Leaving Razumikhin with his mother and sister, Raskolnikov returns to his own building. Raskolnikov tries to find out what he wants, but the artisan says only one word — "murderer", and walks off. Petrified, Raskolnikov returns to his room and falls into thought and then sleep. He wakens from an eerie nightmare about the murder of the old woman to find another complete stranger present, this time a man of aristocratic appearance. The man politely introduces himself as Arkady Ivanovich Svidrigailov. He claims to no longer have any romantic interest in Dunya, but wants to stop her from marrying Luzhin, and offers her ten thousand roubles. Raskolnikov refuses the money on her behalf and refuses to facilitate a meeting. Svidrigailov also mentions that his wife, who defended Dunya at the time of the unpleasantness but died shortly afterwards, has left her 3000 rubles in her will. The meeting with Luzhin that evening begins with talk of Svidrigailov—his depraved character, his presence in Petersburg, the unexpected death of his wife and the 3000 rubles left to Dunya. Luzhin takes offence when Dunya insists on resolving the issue with her brother, and when Raskolnikov draws attention to the slander in his letter, Luzhin becomes reckless, exposing his true character.
В поправках к существующей в УК Греции статье уточняется, что уголовное преследование предусмотрено за публикацию ложных новостей «способных вызвать беспокойство или страх у граждан или поколебать доверие общества к национальной экономике, обороноспособности страны или общественному здравоохранению». Согласно новой формулировке, распространение фейков наказывается лишением свободы на срок не менее трех месяцев и крупным штрафом. Греческие журналисты назвали данное решение Парламента попыткой ограничить свободу слова и контролировать личное мнение, так как обновленная статья УК касается любой информации, являющейся предметом общественного обсуждения.
Legal Punishment
Перевод ПОЛУЧИЛ НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский: get the punishment, get detention, receive the punishment, get him, gets punished. criminal fine – уголовный штраф. offers free real time quotes, portfolio, streaming charts, financial news, live stock market data and more. Many translated example sentences containing "наказание" – English-Russian dictionary and search engine for English translations.
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- Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском.
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Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Найдено 30 результатов перевода перевода фразы "наказание" с русского на английский. Значение, Синонимы, Антонимы. offers free real time quotes, portfolio, streaming charts, financial news, live stock market data and more. How does "наказание нанесен" translate from russian to english: translations with transcription, pronunciation and examples in the online dictionary.
Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?
This would be an administrative punishment. Это и было бы для них административным наказанием. That is cruel and unusual punishment. Это очень жестокое и необычное наказание. Ты напрашиваешься на наказание. Это жестокое и необычное наказание.
Just punishment is the best deterrent. Справедливое наказание — это наилучший способ сдерживания. This is cruel and unusual punishment. Crucifixion was a Roman method of punishment. Распятие было римским методом наказания.
Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal. The torture of a criminal during the course of his trial is a cruelty consecrated by custom in most nations. It is used with an intent either to make him confess his crime, or to explain some contradiction into which he had been led during his examination, or discover his accomplices, or for some kind of metaphysical and incomprehensible purgation of infamy, or, finally, in order to discover other crimes of which he is not accused, but of which he may be guilty. No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can society take from him the public protection until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted. What right, then, but that of power, can authorise the punishment of a citizen so long as there remains any doubt of his guilt? This dilemma is frequent. Either he is guilty, or not guilty. If guilty, he should only suffer the punishment ordained by the laws, and torture becomes useless, as his confession is unnecessary.
Brudner, A.
Burgh, R. Caruso, G. Chau, P. Chiao, V. Christie, N. British Journal of Criminology, 17: 1—15. Ciocchetti, C. Cogley, Z. Timpe and C.
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Влюбленные много времени проводят вместе. Валенте знаком с детьми Бюндхен. Недавно Жизель уже плакала на публике. Она эмоционально отреагировала на поведение Тома Брэди, который сейчас встречается с Ириной Шейк.
Английские слова/лексика на тему «Виды преступлений и наказаний» — Crime and punishment
Русско-английский и англо-русский юридический онлайн-словарь. If the IRS rejected your request to remove a penalty, you may be able to request an Appeals conference or hearing. You have 30 days from the date of the rejection letter to file your request for an appeal. Преступление и наказание придумать ** английском ПОЖАЛУЙСТА!!!!! 25 просмотров. How does "наказание нанесен" translate from russian to english: translations with transcription, pronunciation and examples in the online dictionary. Получайте свежие новости от «Коммерсантъ UK» по электронной почте.
Наказание - перевод с русского на английский
Gravy SEAL A gravy SEAL is a person either belonging to a militia group or has an unhealthy obsession with the military, guns, and anti-government views, but was never actually in the military due to either being grossly out of shape, mentally unfit, or just too dumb to function. Years of dead end jobs and poor diet have made white, middle aged men very upset. Although a term of mockery, Gravy SEALs should be taken seriously, as they are deluded AND have access to copious amounts of arms, and plenty of just as delusional friends to back them up.
As a result, they would also violate the Fourth Amendment. This rate is highest for queer women and trans, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals Buist, 2020; Donohue et al.
Что является наиболее тяжелым наказанием?
This would be an administrative punishment. Это и было бы для них административным наказанием. That is cruel and unusual punishment. Это очень жестокое и необычное наказание. Ты напрашиваешься на наказание.
Это жестокое и необычное наказание. Just punishment is the best deterrent. Справедливое наказание — это наилучший способ сдерживания. This is cruel and unusual punishment. Crucifixion was a Roman method of punishment.
Скопировать Бернард Феррион, вы арестованы за убийство Деллы Феррион. На прошлой неделе они арестовали тебя за то, что ты стукнул свою мать, формально ты избежал наказания С чего они вообще о тебе подумали? They arrested you last week for whacking your mother. You got off on a technicality. Now, the woman next door turns up dead from a blow to the head. What could possibly make them think of you?
Скопировать Он не может быть превыше закона только потому, что он полицейский. Он не должен избежать наказания только благодаря неожиданному результату. Он избил невинного человека, сломал скулу, сломал руку, отправил его в больницу. He beat up an innocent man... Скопировать Ты знаешь, мы с ним не разговариваем. Это часть его наказания.
Как ты можешь часами сидеть и слушать это? How can you just sit here hour after hour and listen to that?