With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen. Retrouvez toute l’actualité de Emmanuel Kant. Suivez nos dernières informations, reportages, décryptages et analyses sur Le Point. Breaking Irish and International News. We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider.
Иммануил Кант: философ, присягнувший на верность Российской империи
Адмиралы Балтийского флота уверены, что Канта звали Эммануэль. Эммануэль Кант.#кант #балтфлот Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen. Settings and more. Buffering. Emmanuelle Kant (Original Mix) (our 2nd recordeal!) BESTINSPACE ™. Новости компаний. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant. Новости компаний.
Bookreader Item Preview
- Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
- Популярное за месяц
- Не в себе — LiveJournal
- Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте | Онлайн-журнал Эксмо
Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде
| emmanuelle_kant (emmakant) - Profile | Pinterest | 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. |
| Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер» | Иммануил Кант родился в Кенигсберге в 1724 году, прожил в городе всю жизнь, не покидая его пределов, и был похоронен у северной стены Собора в профессорском склепе. |
| Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде // Новости НТВ | Tag: Immanuel Kant. Chris Hedges: The Evil Within Us. March 22, 2021. |
| Кант Иммануил | Иммануил Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кенигсберге, Пруссия, в небогатой семье ремесленника. |
| Advance: концепция Макрона о воинственной и сильной Европе ошибочна | DEV Community. Emmanuel Kant Duarte profile picture. |
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
Пабло Мучник является автором нескольких книг о Канте, он лауреат различных национальных и международных стипендий и наград, был вице-президентом и президентом Североамериканского общества Канта. В Калининград профессор из США приехал впервые, признав, что очень ждал этого визита. Это моя Мекка. Калининград прекрасный город. В США очень много пропаганды по поводу России, однако, я был очень рад получить такую прекрасную возможность посетить город Канта.
Его идеи были популярны и после его смерти; даже признаётся некоторое влияние на теорию демократического мира или на либеральное направление в целом. Поэтому передо мной встала задача — изучить политическую мысль философа.
Об этом сообщает журналист Саша Тавольери. Источник: Reuters 32-летний футболист, выступавший последние семь лет за «Челси», стал владельцем клуба «Виртон». По итогам завершившегося сезона клуб вылетел в третий бельгийский дивизион. По информации источника, Канте лично ездил на базу команды, чтобы оценить инфраструктуру клуба.
In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed.
But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world.
Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way.
Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it.
You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.
Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind.
The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition.
For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience.
So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real.
So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161.
These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based.
He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life.
Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based. Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws.
Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good.
In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God.
In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use.
He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense.
On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me. If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility.
Why not? The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision.
If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time.
But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it.
Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now. For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time.
This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve.
For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism.
Иммануил Кант: философ, присягнувший на верность Российской империи
| «Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе | The governor of Kaliningrad, Anton Alikhanov, said Friday that Immanuel Kant is responsible for the outbreak of war in Ukraine. |
| Immanuel Kant | С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. |
Новая экспозиция, первая книга, премьера лекции и стендап
| Immanuel Kant - слушать песни исполнителя онлайн бесплатно на | Что любопытно, Эммануэль Макрон говорит об этом сейчас, когда реальна перспектива возвращения к власти в США Дональда Трампа. |
| «Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта | Reform of institutions: Emmanuel Macron receives François Hollande at the Élysée. |
| Биография Иммануила Кант – читайте об авторе на Литрес | French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday urged Europe to wake up to the fact that it was not sufficiently armed in the face of global threats such as Russian aggression that pose an existential. |
Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. подкасты – радио sputnik, эммануэль макрон, нато, евросоюз, мулен руж, вторая мировая война (1939-1945), европа, польша, россия, анджей дуда, политика – радио sputnik, боевые действия. О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам.
Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе
Источник: Reuters 32-летний футболист, выступавший последние семь лет за «Челси», стал владельцем клуба «Виртон». По итогам завершившегося сезона клуб вылетел в третий бельгийский дивизион. По информации источника, Канте лично ездил на базу команды, чтобы оценить инфраструктуру клуба. Бельгийская федерация уже проинформирована о процессе продажи, на данный момент сделка находится в процессе оформления документов.
Kant for us is a Russian trophy. Like everything you see in the Kaliningrad region - said Alikhanov. He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies.
Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone. For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure. First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause. From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself.
Будет бороться за место профессора, и вся история с войной Пруссии и России особенно его не затронет. Он даже письмо Екатерине Второй напишет, с просьбой о месте в университете. Не заразитесь женской логикой Он дважды собирался жениться и не собрался. У него изначально было слабое здоровье, но он прожил почти 80 лет. Он был на званых вечерах, даже блистал, хотя все считали его не очень красивым. Впрочем, и званые вечера были весьма провинциальны, а одна из дам, почтившая своим вниманием Канта, писала ему письма с орфографическими ошибками. У нее ничего особенного не вышло, и Кант прослыл женоненавистником. Что подтверждал и в высказываниях, называя брак рабством. Женщин же он считал существами, не способными логически мыслить. Рецепт один — отойти в сторону, чтобы не заразиться. Был момент, когда Кант в Кенигсберге оказался практически рок-звездой. Его работы мало кто мог прочесть и осмыслить, но это добавляло загадочности персонажу. В городе его знали все, и все делали вид, что понимают хоть что-нибудь. С другой стороны, если уж Генрих Гейне, которому было семь лет, когда Кант умер, так сильно спустя годы реагировал на упоминание философских трудов чудака из Кенигсберга не любил Гейне «Критику чистого разума», что тут поделаешь? График не на фиг Он был узнаваем. Человек, ненавидевший дневник в гимназии и самокопание, придумал для себя график. График, практически исключавший вмешательства извне. Как ни странно, этот график как раз извне был особенно интересен: выход из дома в определенный час на прогулку по определенному маршруту. Те, кто в дом были вхожи, знали и другие правила. В пять утра встать после семичасового сна, надеть колпак, а сверху — маленькую треугольную шляпу. Работать до семи в кабинете. Прочитать лекцию. Без пятнадцати час начать одеваться к обеду, пообедать и пойти на прогулку. Его прогулки стали настолько известными, что на пути Канта стали караулить местные попрошайки. На прогулках он дышал носом.
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic) sur TikTok |66.4K j'aime.23.8K e la dernière vidéo de Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic). French President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday urged Europe to wake up to the fact that it was not sufficiently armed in the face of global threats such as Russian aggression that pose an existential. 3 monthly listeners.
Blog Stats
- Голосование "Великие имена": в самолётах Канта уже называют "Эммануилом"
- «Politika»
- Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
- Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant - World Today News
- Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением...
‘Nothing would survive’ Scientists warn dark energy could ‘END universe at any moment’
В музее известного философа с помощью искусственного интеллекта создали виртуального собеседника. Пока задать вопрос можно только на интересные ему темы. Но разработчики обещают расширить «кругозор» мыслителя. С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. В беседе с вируальным Кантом надо соблюдать определенный этикет, точнее правила работы с системой.
Во-первых , он не терпит фамильярности.
Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr. Scholz has not yet prohibited the Russian military from dismantling it. Our news channels Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.
Поэтому передо мной встала задача — изучить политическую мысль философа. Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение.
Есть несколько залов, где мы интерактивные приемы используем. В зале "Кенигсбергское время", например, можно услышать цитаты известных людей определенной эпохи - мы о пяти веках Кенигсберга говорим. Надели мононаушник — слышим Иммануила Канта, который рассуждает о городе.
Надели другой - мы уже в двадцатом столетии, слышим Маяковского, который прилетал в Кенигсберг и из Девау ехал на машине в Берлин. Мне кажется, это очень интересно. Канта Валентин Балановский. Кое-что может найти и человек, который хорошо разбирается в предмете.
Full text issues
- Следи за собой, будь осторожен
- Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде // Новости НТВ
- «Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
- Треки альбома
Scholz “forbade” Putin from quoting Immanuel Kant
Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world? Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom. Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law.
So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations. And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it.
This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another. But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles.
To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire. In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way.
So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be. Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing. Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way. Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control. To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us. But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity. Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims.
Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally. Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61. This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it. This is, naturally, a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know whether that maxim could also hold as a universal practical law. I therefore apply the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could through my maxim at the same time give such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove has been made. I at once become aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that there would be no deposits at all. The issue is not whether it would be good if everyone acted on my maxim, or whether I would like it, but only whether it would be possible for my maxim to be willed as a universal law.
This gets at the form, not the matter or content, of the maxim. A maxim has morally permissible form, for Kant, only if it could be willed as a universal law. If my maxim fails this test, as this one does, then it is morally impermissible for me to act on it. If my maxim passes the universal law test, then it is morally permissible for me to act on it, but I fully exercise my autonomy only if my fundamental reason for acting on this maxim is that it is morally permissible or required that I do so. Imagine that I am moved by a feeling of sympathy to formulate the maxim to help someone in need. In this case, my original reason for formulating this maxim is that a certain feeling moved me. Such feelings are not entirely within my control and may not be present when someone actually needs my help. So it would not be wrong to act on this maxim when the feeling of sympathy so moves me. But helping others in need would not fully exercise my autonomy unless my fundamental reason for doing so is not that I have some feeling or desire, but rather that it would be right or at least permissible to do so. Only when such a purely formal principle supplies the fundamental motive for my action do I act autonomously.
Even when my maxims are originally suggested by my feelings and desires, if I act only on morally permissible or required maxims because they are morally permissible or required , then my actions will be autonomous. And the reverse is true as well: for Kant this is the only way to act autonomously. The highest good and practical postulates Kant holds that reason unavoidably produces not only consciousness of the moral law but also the idea of a world in which there is both complete virtue and complete happiness, which he calls the highest good. Furthermore, we can believe that the highest good is possible only if we also believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, according to Kant. On this basis, he claims that it is morally necessary to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, which he calls postulates of pure practical reason. Moreover, our fundamental reason for choosing to act on such maxims should be that they have this lawgiving form, rather than that acting on them would achieve some end or goal that would satisfy a desire 5:27. For example, I should help others in need not, at bottom, because doing so would make me feel good, even if it would, but rather because it is right; and it is right or permissible to help others in need because this maxim can be willed as a universal law. Although Kant holds that the morality of an action depends on the form of its maxim rather than its end or goal, he nevertheless claims both that every human action has an end and that we are unavoidably concerned with the consequences of our actions 4:437; 5:34; 6:5—7, 385. This is not a moral requirement but simply part of what it means to be a rational being. Moreover, Kant also holds the stronger view that it is an unavoidable feature of human reason that we form ideas not only about the immediate and near-term consequences of our actions, but also about ultimate consequences.
But neither of these ideas by itself expresses our unconditionally complete end, as human reason demands in its practical use. And happiness by itself would not be unconditionally good, because moral virtue is a condition of worthiness to be happy 5:111. So our unconditionally complete end must combine both virtue and happiness. It is this ideal world combining complete virtue with complete happiness that Kant normally has in mind when he discusses the highest good. Kant says that we have a duty to promote the highest good, taken in this sense 5:125. He does not mean, however, to be identifying some new duty that is not derived from the moral law, in addition to all the particular duties we have that are derived from the moral law. Rather, as we have seen, Kant holds that it is an unavoidable feature of human reasoning, instead of a moral requirement, that we represent all particular duties as leading toward the promotion of the highest good. Nor does Kant mean that anyone has a duty to realize or actually bring about the highest good through their own power, although his language sometimes suggests this 5:113, 122. Here Kant does not mean that we unavoidably represent the highest good as possible, since his view is that we must represent it as possible only if we are to fulfill our duty of promoting it, and yet we may fail at doing our duty. Rather, we have a choice about whether to conceive of the highest good as possible, to regard it as impossible, or to remain noncommittal 5:144—145.
But we can fulfill our duty of promoting the highest good only by choosing to conceive of the highest good as possible, because we cannot promote any end without believing that it is possible to achieve that end 5:122. This is because to comply with that duty we must believe that the highest good is possible, and yet to believe that the highest good is possible we must believe that the soul is immortal and that God exists, according to Kant. The highest good, as we have seen, would be a world of complete morality and happiness. This does not mean that we can substitute endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law for holiness in the concept of the highest good, but rather that we must represent that complete conformity as an infinite progress toward the limit of holiness. Rather, his view is that we must represent holiness as continual progress toward complete conformity of our dispositions with the moral law that begins in this life and extends into infinity.
Опираясь на законы механики, открытые И.
Ньютоном , Кант заявляет: «Дайте мне материю, и я покажу вам, как из неё должен возникнуть мир», оговариваясь, однако, что естественно-научное в то время механистическое понимание природы не может объяснить «возникновение одной только былинки или гусеницы» Соч. Сочинение «О форме и принципах чувственно воспринимаемого и умопостигаемого мира» «De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis», 1770 знаменует начало перехода Канта к «критической философии», поворотным пунктом в котором стало его «пробуждение» в 1771 г. Юмом анализа причинности. В «Критике чистого разума» Кант обосновывает исходное положение своей системы: кроме мира явлений, находящихся в пространстве и времени, т. Эта родственная философскому скептицизму дуалистическая концепция обычно характеризовалась в 19 в. Главная задача «Критики чистого разума» — исследование возможности создания философии как науки предшествующая философия, по Канту, была лишь рассуждением на философские темы.
Для этого Кант предпринимает исследование природы научного знания, общепризнанным образцом которого является чистая математика и математическое естествознание, т. Содержание математического знания составляют положения, обладающие строгой всеобщностью и необходимостью. Но такие положения а без них невозможна наука не могут быть почерпнуты из опыта, дающего основания лишь для индуктивных выводов, которым недоступна аподиктическая всеобщность. Следовательно, положения чистой математики априорны, т. Необходимо, однако, объяснить, как в этой системе априорных положений возможно приращение знания. Рационалисты 17—18 вв.
Кант не отрицает наличия априорных аналитических суждений, но показывает, что они не ведут к приращению знания. Чтобы понять реально совершающееся умножение математических знаний, необходимо признать существование априорных синтетических суждений, в то время как рационалисты рассматривали все синтетические суждения как апостериорные, т. Апостериори и априори. Кант ставит основополагающий вопрос: как возможны синтетические суждения априори? Поскольку такие суждения не могут быть почерпнуты из опыта, из чувственных восприятий окружающих вещей ибо в таком случае они не были бы априорными , следует признать существование априорных чувственных созерцаний, образующих источник синтетических суждений априори. Такими априорными чувственными созерцаниями являются, согласно Канту, пространство и время.
И здесь Кант решительно расходится с рационалистами, утверждавшими, что априорные созерцания, или интеллектуальная интуиция, присущи только разуму. Кант отвергает понятие интеллектуальной интуиции и тем самым рационалистическое понимание априорного как имеющего сверхопытное применение, т. Априорное знание, утверждает Кант, не выходит за границы возможного опыта, оно носит не сверхопытный, а доопытный характер. Вслед за анализом природы математического знания Кант ставит вопрос: как возможно чистое естествознание? Последнее, в отличие от чистой математики, содержит в себе не только априорные положения, но и эмпирические по своему происхождению понятия материя, движение, притяжение и т. Априорные понятия, каковыми прежде всего являются категории , сами по себе лишены содержания, они служат для синтеза чувственных данных, для формирования опыта, который не сводится к совокупности чувственных данных, но представляет собой их категориальный синтез, поскольку содержит в себе представление о причинно-следственных, необходимых отношениях.
Настаивая на несводимости априорных, т.
После переезда Вломера в Берлин другой студент, Кристоф Бернард Калленберг, предложил Канту бесплатное проживание и оказывал поддержку. Некоторую помощь оказывал также Рихтер, дядя Иммануила. Учёба для него была превыше всего; в розыгрышах, пьянках, драках и прочих студенческих развлечениях он не участвовал. Уже тогда многие новые ученики предпочитали держаться Канта, помогавшего им в учёбе. Многие младшекурсники уважали будущего философа и брали с него пример. Студентом Кант увлекался философией Мишеля де Монтеня , многие отрывки из которого он знал наизусть. Редким развлечением была игра со своими друзьями в бильярд , в который он часто выигрывал деньги [44]. Кант посещал даже лекции по теологии Шульца: он стремился к любому знанию, даже не связанному с его непосредственными интересами.
Также он слушал лекции Иоганна Кипке [de] — его работы в области философии произвели впечатление на Канта [45]. Одним из самых известных и почитаемых философов, у которых учился Кант, был Мартин Кнутцен. Несмотря на то, что Кнутцен ни разу не упоминается в трудах Иммануила Канта, принято считать, что он оказал значительное влияние, наибольшее из всех его университетских преподавателей. Кант любил своего преподавателя больше всех остальных и не пропустил ни одного занятия [46]. В 1738 году Кнутцен предсказал появление кометы зимой 1744-го [ком. В этом же году был издан его труд «Rational Thoughts on the Comets». Это подтолкнуло Канта к науке и, вероятно, послужило в будущем источником вдохновения для книги «Всеобщая естественная история и теория небес». Иммануил Кант увлечённо следил за академическими диспутами вокруг предсказания Кнутцена, что в итоге развило у мыслителя интерес к космогонии [47]. Кроме того, именно Кнутцен познакомил Канта с трудами Исаака Ньютона [48].
Сам Кнутцен при этом не выделял Канта: перечисляя выдающихся учеников в переписке с Эйлером , он ни разу не упомянул его имя [49]. Начало творчества[ править править код ] Обложка немецкого издания первого труда И. Канта Разум Канта «созрел» в 1744 году, когда он берётся за написание своей первой работы — « Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил». Кант публикует эту работу независимо, в то время как имел шанс написать её на латыни и представить как магистерскую диссертацию. Однако, обходя барьеры академического рецензирования, пишет её на немецком языке в весьма надменном тоне, намереваясь посягнуть на авторитет Ньютона и Лейбница. Вероятно, он преследовал цель привлечь внимание к своей персоне, а не добиться успеха в академическом сообществе [50] , хотя некоторые комментаторы Канта ложно приняли эту работу за его диссертацию, в то время как до защиты диссертации Канту оставалось по меньшей мере 10 лет [51]. Произведение было окончено в 1746 году, когда Канту было 22 года, а в следующем году он написал введение и предисловие к труду [52]. Кант выставил свой труд на рецензирование ещё в 1746 году, и он был одобрен, но официально был опубликован только в 1749 году. В своей работе Кант исследует феномен силы в физике с точки зрения метафизики , полагая, что любая подобная проблема должна рассматриваться в таком ключе.
В работе Кант вступает в полемику по поводу живой и мёртвой сил между Декартом и Лейбницем. Таким образом, книга была посвящена в первую очередь научному сообществу, а именно участникам дискуссии вокруг феномена силы. При прочтении сейчас трактат изобилует нестандартными для современной физики натурфилософскими терминами. Профессор философии Мартин Шёнфельд называет «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил» худшей работой Канта, критикуя, в частности, стиль изложения и излишнюю многословность [53]. Иммануил Кант пытался урегулировать дебаты, найдя компромисс в обеих позициях, видя часть правды с обеих сторон, оставаясь при этом беспристрастным. Во введении он отвергает безусловный авторитет великих учёных и свободно высказывает как аргументы «за», так и «против» обеих сторон конфликта [54]. В работе был и ряд фактологических ошибок. Например, Кант не всегда правильно понимал аргументы сторон, делал ошибки в формулах, из чего Шёнфельд делает вывод, что на момент написания познания Канта в области механики были поверхностными [56]. На произведение было написано несколько рецензий, среди которых была критика от Готхольда Эфраима Лессинга , который заявил, что Кант «…исследует живые силы, но свои собственные оценить не может» [57].
Рассматривая свою работу в более зрелом возрасте, Кант испытывал чувство неловкости [51]. Отъезд из Кёнигсберга[ править править код ] В конце 1744 года тяжело заболел Георг Кант. Ранее переживший инсульт, отец Иммануила скончался 24 марта 1746 года, оставив без присмотра трёх детей: сестёр 17 и 14 лет и 9-летнего брата. Пока отец болел, Канту приходилось проводить долгое время у себя дома. Вероятно, значительная часть «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил» была написана именно в этот период, когда посещения лекций в университете было затруднено. В течение двух лет после смерти отца Кант вынужден заботиться о доме, в котором он жил. Потребовалось много времени, чтобы продать имущество отца и позаботиться о сёстрах. Погрязнув в домашних делах, он потерял возможность продолжать обучение в университете и вскоре, в 1748 году, покидает Кёнигсберг. Иммануил Кант становится частным учителем для трёх семей: детей из баронского рода Кейзерлингов , Бернхарда Фридриха фон Хюльсена, а также троих детей пастора реформатской церкви в деревне Юдшен сегодняшняя Весёловка.
У него сложились хорошие отношения с членами местной общины, и ему даже несколько раз предлагали стать крёстным отцом. Семья Бернхарда фон Хюльсена общалась с Кантом и после его отъезда, они считали Канта практически членом семьи. Позже двое из учеников Канта делили с ним жильё в Кёнигсберге, когда поступили в университет, а он оказывал им помощь. Несмотря на любовь его работодателей, сам Иммануил Кант критически относился к себе как к учителю, да и вовсе полагал профессию учителя слишком хлопотной. На протяжении своей работы частным учителем Кант делал наброски для будущих научных трудов и, вероятно, всегда рассматривал возможность возвращения в университет, поскольку не прекращал процесс обучения и не отказывался от «академического гражданства» [58]. Возвращение[ править править код ] Спустя шесть лет отсутствия, в августе 1754 года, Кант возвращается в Кёнигсберг для защиты диссертации и издания новых работ. Он постепенно возвращается к университетской жизни и, возможно, становится научным руководителем для одного из своих учеников из Кейзерлингов. В течение этого года он опубликовал два сочинения о космогонии в местном еженедельнике в преддверии выхода своего второго произведения — « Всеобщая естественная история и теория небес [en] ». Изначально он отвечал на конкурсный вопрос, выдвинутый Прусской академией наук : «изменяла ли Земля движение вокруг своей оси со времён возникновения?
Кант опасался гонений со стороны духовенства, а потому приступил к работе над книгой только когда убедился, что будет в безопасности. Однако опасения были напрасны, поскольку произведение вышло практически незамеченным. У издателя в то время были проблемы в связи с банкротством. Кант решил продолжить свою университетскую карьеру.
How is autonomous action possible? How is a perception of beauty possible?
How are living creatures possible?
I Kant Even: German Chancellor Triggered After Putin Quotes Legendary Philosopher
Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. suggesting in 2013 that he should be made an official symbol of the Kaliningrad Region. Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. На этой странице собраны самые актуальные новости университета БФУ им Канта.