5. Criminal justice and criminal proceedings перевод на Русский Изучай английский с помощью книг, фильмов и подкастов из интернета. Субтитры, возможность мгновенного перевода, сохранения новых слов одним кликом и множество интересных разделов – все это в Джунглях! Штраф 2. Fine - Штраф 3. Ticket - Штрафной талон 4. Citation - Штрафное извещение 5. Warning - Предупреждение о штрафе 6. Traffic violation - Нарушение правил дорожного движения 7. Speeding - Превышение скорости 8. Parking fine. Three Volumes: In Which Are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points That Relate Either to Publick Government, or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done into English by Several Hands. онлайн новости последнего часа Подбор самых актуальных новостей на сегодня.
Google and Apple Settle Lawsuit Alleging Wage-Fixing
She passionately reads to him the story of the raising of Lazarus from the Gospel of John. His fascination with her, which had begun at the time when her father spoke of her, increases and he decides that they must face the future together. As he leaves he tells her that he will come back tomorrow and tell her who killed her friend Lizaveta. When Raskolnikov presents himself for his interview, Porfiry resumes and intensifies his insinuating, provocative, ironic chatter, without ever making a direct accusation. Back at his room Raskolnikov is horrified when the old artisan suddenly appears at his door. He had been one of those present when Raskolnikov returned to the scene of the murders, and had reported his behavior to Porfiry. The atmosphere deteriorates as guests become drunk and the half-mad Katerina Ivanovna engages in a verbal attack on her German landlady. With chaos descending, everyone is surprised by the sudden and portentous appearance of Luzhin. He sternly announces that a 100-ruble banknote disappeared from his apartment at the precise time that he was being visited by Sonya, whom he had invited in order to make a small donation. Sonya fearfully denies stealing the money, but Luzhin persists in his accusation and demands that someone search her. The mood in the room turns against Sonya, Luzhin chastises her, and the landlady orders the family out.
Luzhin is discredited, but Sonya is traumatized, and she runs out of the apartment. Raskolnikov follows her. But it is only a prelude to his confession that he is the murderer of the old woman and Lizaveta. Painfully, he tries to explain his abstract motives for the crime to uncomprehending Sonya. She is horrified, not just at the crime, but at his own self-torture, and tells him that he must hand himself in to the police. Lebezyatnikov appears and tells them that the landlady has kicked Katerina Ivanovna out of the apartment and that she has gone mad. They find Katerina Ivanovna surrounded by people in the street, completely insane, trying to force the terrified children to perform for money, and near death from her illness. Svidrigailov has been residing next door to Sonya, and overheard every word of the murder confession. Part 6 edit Razumikhin tells Raskolnikov that Dunya has become troubled and distant after receiving a letter from someone. As Raskolnikov is about to set off in search of Svidrigailov, Porfiry himself appears and politely requests a brief chat.
He sincerely apologises for his previous behavior and seeks to explain the reasons behind it. Strangely, Raskolnikov begins to feel alarmed at the thought that Porfiry might think he is innocent. He claims that he will be arresting him soon, but urges him to confess to make it easier on himself. Raskolnikov chooses to continue the struggle. Raskolnikov finds Svidrigailov at an inn and warns him against approaching Dunya.
This rate is highest for queer women and trans, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals Buist, 2020; Donohue et al. This known pathway clearly depicts a systemic issue—one that warrants attention and remediation.
This Note examines the unique risks of these proposals—particularly with respect to people on probation and parole—and argues that RFID implants would constitute a systematic violation of individual privacy and bodily integrity. As a result, they would also violate the Fourth Amendment.
They will really receive punishment? Пол теперь сможет получить наказание, на которое он вправе рассчитывать. Эй, это задница просто получит наказание, для этого она и нужна. Мы проследим, чтобы он получил наказание. Он нарушил закон, а она получит наказание? But he breaks the law, and she gets punished?
(наказание)
| Punishment – наказание | Legal Punishment. First published Tue Jan 2, 2001; substantive revision Fri Dec 10, 2021. The question of whether, and how, legal punishment can be justified has long been a central concern of legal, moral, and political philosophy: what could justify a state in using the apparatus of the law to inflict. |
| Вы Арестованы! Штраф – Английское Словечко! | Владелец сайта предпочёл скрыть описание страницы. |
| Жизель Бюндхен разрыдалась из-за полицейского, выписавшего ей штраф на дороге | Как "наказание" в английский: punishment, penalty, discipline. Контекстный перевод: Во многих странах строжайшая мера наказания — смертная казнь. |
| Capital Punishment - English for everyone | английский испанский французский португальский русский турецкий. |
| Death Penalty - Essay Samples And Topic Ideas For Free | Они встречаются в новостях, фильмах, повседневной жизни. Поэтому подборка на тему «Crime and punishment» («Виды преступлений и наказаний») на английском языке будет полезна абсолютно всем, не только юристам и сотрудникам правоохранительных органов. |
Переводы пользователей
- Legal Punishment (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- Смотрите также
- Geko 6800 ED-AA/HHBA Handbücher | ManualsLib
- Google and Apple Settle Lawsuit Alleging Wage-Fixing
Наказание - перевод с русского на английский
Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Автор Ф. Перевод: Констанция Гарнетт.
And the criminal is Mugger This word is only used if the crime happens outside. Слайд 10 1. Why do Juveniles commit crimes?
Do they need help or punishment? Do they need to be locked up to be put into prison? Слайд 11 1. In prison young people will meet real criminals , who may unfortunately teach them more about being a criminal. What do you think would be the worst thing about being in prison? Слайд 12 1.
Wife kills the husband. Under the influence, the passion. Because there is certain... Oh, affect that sounds like, yeah, alcohol.
So in this, well, in Russian, for example, we have this sort of, okay, help me out with the term. So there is mitigating, you know, some sort of conditions which make the punishment harder. What is the opposite to that something that makes the punishment less severe? Well, mitigating circumstances.
Oh, mitigating is something that helps you to get... Without an action you mean. Those are mitigating circumstances. Under influence, kind of things.
But under influence of what? So in this case, you were not under influence of alcohol or drugs. Nothing like that. You were just in shock.
Oh, okay. So maybe like some kind of mental. Mental breakdown. So when we give our definitions.
Double check them on Google because you have English and then you have legal English, which is kind of different things. And also laws change as well. And definitions as well can change sometimes. So you said you have constitution.
So Turkey has a constitution that is written and... And if you are against that, you will be punished according to that. For example, like burning the flag. It is a crime in the US as well.
A lot of things are crime in Russia. I want to comment on this. Because this was like, that was a really pushed during the Vietnam War was can we burn the flag can we wear the flag as clothing. Because it used to be against the law to if a flag, an American flag purposely or accidentally was dropped to the ground, if it touched the ground, you have to burn it out of a ceremony to show respect to the flag or you were not allowed, it was against the law to wear the American flag as clothing.
It was against that law. And underwear. Same in Turkey. Underwear short, anything.
So funny. I have pajamas with the American flag. But in the end Vietnam War came with all of the riots and rebellion and anti-war. And this kind of thing changed it.
So you have, so Turkey has a written constitution. Of course, Russia has a written and of course, America, the UK does not have a written constitution. Oh, right. Which is really interesting.
This is old historical structure. Maybe it does exist. I believe there is a Bill of Rights, or at least there is discussion about introducing it in the UK. So our founding fathers knew this.
So they put very general things. And so, of course, as time changes and people change, conditions change. You have to interpret it or misinterpret it. And do they still wear the wigs?
They do, they do. I love these wigs. So actually like in the movies and everithing? I mean, it is so crazy to watch the British in court fighting each other or not in court, in the parliament, I should say.
In the parliament. Not in America. The House of Parliament is a very rowdy parliament. Yeah, rowdy is a great word.
It is fun to watch. And very noisy. They insult each other. They get emotional.
And they boo and make noise.
Crucifixion was a Roman method of punishment. Распятие было римским методом наказания. Punishment and examinations are seen as threats. Наказание и экзамены считаются угрозами. Примеры употребления слов в разных контекстах предоставляются исключительно в лингвистических целях, т. Все образцы собраны автоматически из открытых источников с помощью технологии поиска на основе двуязычных данных. Если вы обнаружили орфографическую, пунктуационную или иную ошибку в оригинале или переводе, используйте опцию "Сообщить о проблеме" или напишите нам В этом разделе вы можете посмотреть, как употребляются слова и выражения в разных контекстах на реальных примерах. Все примеры собраны из уже переведенных текстов: официальных документов, сайтов, журналов и диалогов из фильмов. Раздел Контексты поможет в изучении английского, немецкого, испанского, русского и других языков.
Здесь вы сможете найти примеры с фразовыми глаголами, устойчивыми выражениями и многозначными словами в разнообразных по стилю и тематикам текстах Примеры можно отсортировать по переводам и тематикам, а также сделать уточняющий поиск по найденным примерам. Изучайте иностранные языки, смотрите перевод миллионов слов и выражений, проверяйте их употребление на реальных примерах благодаря нашей технологии поиска на основе двуязычных данных!
News is bad for you — Не смотрите новости. Статья на английском и русском
The penalty for which is five years in a federal prison. Они понесут наказание. И я также знаю, что ты сидишь тут передо мной только потому, что думаешь, что наказание, которое я могу назначить, не будет иметь значения. Напомните, каково наказание, если вас признают виновным в убийстве в вашей стране? Our brave and dutiful officials will quell the rebellion - Да там, в основном, отбывающие наказание впервые. Mostly first-time offenders.
Они не впервые отбывают наказание. Первый же пропущенный рабочий день - и он начнет отбывать наказание в Синг-синг. The first day of work he misses is the day he begins his sentence at sing sing. Это наказание. Оно повторяется.
В наказание за то, что ты мне помогаешь, ты был отдан другому фею в собственность? So as punishment for helping me, you were given to another Fae as property? Они несут полную ответсвенность за меня, пока мое наказание не закончится. They become completely responsible for me until my punishment is fulfilled. Будет интересно посмотреть, какое наказание он придумает для тебя.
It will be fun to see what sort of punishment he comes up with for you. Скажи мне, когда именно наказание виновных стало для тебя важнее помощи невинным?
Когда молодой преступник совершает преступление, например, я не знаю, поджог, наказание заключается в общественных работах или в колонии для несовершеннолетних? Если это наказание, я хочу, чтобы ты знал, что я принимаю его и понимаю. Епископу голоду было поручено наложить на Рорика соответствующее наказание, если слух окажется правдивым. Произношение Скопировать текст Сообщить об ошибке Bishop Hunger was instructed to impose a suitable penance on Rorik if the rumour was found to be true.
One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system.
After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e. See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism. For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s.
Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find. An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment.
We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid.
Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012. For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment.
Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H. Morris 1981 and Hampton 1984; for a more recent account, see Demetriou 2012; for criticism, see Deigh 1984, Shafer-Landau 1991.
But education theorists also take seriously the Hegelian worry discussed earlier; they view punishment not as a means of conditioning people to behave in certain ways, but rather as a means of teaching them that what they have done should not be done because it is morally wrong. Thus although the education view sets offender reform as an end, it also implies certain nonconsequentialist constraints on how we may appropriately pursue this end. Another distinctive feature of the moral education view is that it conceives of punishment as aiming to confer a benefit on the offender: the benefit of moral education. Critics have objected to the moral education view on various grounds, however. Some are sceptical about whether punishment is the most effective means of moral education. Others deny that most offenders need moral education; many offenders realise what they are doing is wrong but are weak-willed, impulsive, etc. Each of the theories discussed in this section incorporates, in various ways, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements. Whether any of these is more plausible than pure consequentialist or pure retributivist alternatives is, not surprisingly, a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. One possibility, of course, is that none of the theories on offer is successful because punishment is, ultimately, unjustifiable. The next section considers penal abolitionism.
Abolition and Alternatives Abolitionist theorising about punishment takes many different forms, united only by the insistence that we should seek to abolish, rather than merely to reform, our practices of punishment. Classic abolitionist texts include Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994. An initial question is precisely what practices should be abolished. Some abolitionists focus on particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment see, e. Davis 2003. Insofar as such critiques are grounded in concerns about racial disparities, mass incarceration, police abuses, and other features of the U. At the same time, insofar as the critiques are based on particular features of the U. By contrast, other abolitionist accounts focus not on some particular mode s of punishment, or on a particular mode of punishment as administered in this or that legal system, but rather on criminal punishment in any form see, e. The more powerful abolitionist challenge is that punishment cannot be justified even in principle. After all, when the state imposes punishment, it treats some people in ways that would typically outside the context of punishment be impermissible.
It subjects them to intentionally burdensome treatment and to the condemnation of the community. Abolitionists find that the various attempted justifications of this intentionally burdensome condemnatory treatment fail, and thus that the practice is morally wrong — not merely in practice but in principle. For such accounts, a central question is how the state should respond to the types of conduct for which one currently would be subject to punishment. In this section we attend to three notable types of abolitionist theory and the alternatives to punishment that they endorse. But one might regard this as a false dichotomy see Allais 2011; Duff 2011a. A restorative process that is to be appropriate to crime must therefore be one that seeks an adequate recognition, by the offender and by others, of the wrong done—a recognition that must for the offender, if genuine, be repentant; and that seeks an appropriate apologetic reparation for that wrong from the offender. But those are also the aims of punishment as a species of secular penance, as sketched above. A system of criminal punishment, however improved it might be, is of course not well designed to bring about the kind of personal reconciliations and transformations that advocates of restorative justice sometimes seek; but it could be apt to secure the kind of formal, ritualised reconciliation that is the most that a liberal state should try to secure between its citizens. If we focus only on imprisonment, which is still often the preferred mode of punishment in many penal systems, this suggestion will appear laughable; but if we think instead of punishments such as Community Service Orders now part of what is called Community Payback or probation, it might seem more plausible. This argument does not, of course, support that account of punishment against its critics.
A similar issue is raised by the second kind of abolitionist theory that we should note here: the argument that we should replace punishment by a system of enforced restitution see e. For we need to ask what restitution can amount to, what it should involve, if it is to constitute restitution not merely for any harm that might have been caused, but for the wrong that was done; and it is tempting to answer that restitution for a wrong must involve the kind of apologetic moral reparation, expressing a remorseful recognition of the wrong, that communicative punishment on the view sketched above aims to become. More generally, advocates of restorative justice and of restitution are right to highlight the question of what offenders owe to those whom they have wronged — and to their fellow citizens see also Tadros 2011 for a focus on the duties that offenders incur. Some penal theorists, however, especially those who connect punishment to apology, will reply that what offenders owe precisely includes accepting, undertaking, or undergoing punishment. A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result not of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment especially retributivist theories depend are misguided see s. As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021 instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines. Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s.
International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law. But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues. Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010.
For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch.
For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e. In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories.
Petrified, Raskolnikov returns to his room and falls into thought and then sleep. He wakens from an eerie nightmare about the murder of the old woman to find another complete stranger present, this time a man of aristocratic appearance. The man politely introduces himself as Arkady Ivanovich Svidrigailov. He claims to no longer have any romantic interest in Dunya, but wants to stop her from marrying Luzhin, and offers her ten thousand roubles. Raskolnikov refuses the money on her behalf and refuses to facilitate a meeting. Svidrigailov also mentions that his wife, who defended Dunya at the time of the unpleasantness but died shortly afterwards, has left her 3000 rubles in her will. The meeting with Luzhin that evening begins with talk of Svidrigailov—his depraved character, his presence in Petersburg, the unexpected death of his wife and the 3000 rubles left to Dunya. Luzhin takes offence when Dunya insists on resolving the issue with her brother, and when Raskolnikov draws attention to the slander in his letter, Luzhin becomes reckless, exposing his true character. Dunya tells him to leave and never come back.
Now free and with significant capital, they excitedly begin to discuss plans for the future, but Raskolnikov suddenly gets up and leaves, telling them, to their great consternation, that it might be the last time he sees them. He instructs the baffled Razumikhin to remain and always care for them. She is gratified that he is visiting her, but also frightened of his strange manner. He asks a series of merciless questions about her terrible situation and that of Katerina Ivanovna and the children. Raskolnikov begins to realize that Sonya is sustained only by her faith in God. She reveals that she was a friend of the murdered Lizaveta. In fact, Lizaveta gave her a cross and a copy of the Gospels. She passionately reads to him the story of the raising of Lazarus from the Gospel of John. His fascination with her, which had begun at the time when her father spoke of her, increases and he decides that they must face the future together.
As he leaves he tells her that he will come back tomorrow and tell her who killed her friend Lizaveta. When Raskolnikov presents himself for his interview, Porfiry resumes and intensifies his insinuating, provocative, ironic chatter, without ever making a direct accusation. Back at his room Raskolnikov is horrified when the old artisan suddenly appears at his door. He had been one of those present when Raskolnikov returned to the scene of the murders, and had reported his behavior to Porfiry. The atmosphere deteriorates as guests become drunk and the half-mad Katerina Ivanovna engages in a verbal attack on her German landlady. With chaos descending, everyone is surprised by the sudden and portentous appearance of Luzhin. He sternly announces that a 100-ruble banknote disappeared from his apartment at the precise time that he was being visited by Sonya, whom he had invited in order to make a small donation. Sonya fearfully denies stealing the money, but Luzhin persists in his accusation and demands that someone search her.
Перевод текстов
| Geko 6800 ED-AA/HHBA Handbücher | ManualsLib | Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). |
| Punishment – наказание | контексты с "punishment" в английском с переводом "наказание" на русский от PROMT, устойчивые словосочетания и идиомы, значения слов в разных контекстах. |
| Перевод слова НАКАЗАНИЕ. Как будет НАКАЗАНИЕ по-английски? | 1. (noun) A lazy cowboy who neglects their duties on a farm or ranch. 2. (noun) A rural person in an urban environment, such as an office, who's mannersisms are notably different, less competitive, and often performed at a slower pace than the urbanites. The term may be used in either an endearing or. |
(наказание)
Although a term of mockery, Gravy SEALs should be taken seriously, as they are deluded AND have access to copious amounts of arms, and plenty of just as delusional friends to back them up. They may be fat, unhealthy, conspiracy nuts, but they have real guns. Tl;dr - military wannabe LARPers , but with actual guns.
Греция вводит уголовное наказание за распространение ложной информации о коронавирусе 13 ноября 2021, 13:57 Смотри новости и проекты телеканала ОНТ на YouTube Парламент Греции одобрил введение уголовного наказания за распространение фейковых новостей о коронавирусе, передает РИА «Новости».
В поправках к существующей в УК Греции статье уточняется, что уголовное преследование предусмотрено за публикацию ложных новостей «способных вызвать беспокойство или страх у граждан или поколебать доверие общества к национальной экономике, обороноспособности страны или общественному здравоохранению». Согласно новой формулировке, распространение фейков наказывается лишением свободы на срок не менее трех месяцев и крупным штрафом.
But he breaks the law, and she gets punished?
Я прослежу за сторожем, если он виновен я удостоверюсь, чтобы он получил наказание. Эти девчонки не уважают слабых маленьких ботаников, боящихся получить наказание от своих мамочек. Продолжай в том же духе, и получишь наказание!
Чтобы этого вновь не повторилось все четверо получат наказание. Ты хочешь получить наказание прямо сейчас?
Possible reasons for punishment[ edit ] See also: Criminal justice There are many possible reasons that might be given to justify or explain why someone ought to be punished; here follows a broad outline of typical, possibly conflicting, justifications. Deterrence[ edit ] Two reasons given to justify punishment [18] is that it is a measure to prevent people from committing an offence - deterring previous offenders from re-offending, and preventing those who may be contemplating an offence they have not committed from actually committing it. This punishment is intended to be sufficient that people would choose not to commit the crime rather than experience the punishment. The aim is to deter everyone in the community from committing offences. Some criminologists state that the number of people convicted for crime does not decrease as a result of more severe punishment and conclude that deterrence is ineffective.
These criminologists therefore argue that lack of deterring effect of increasing the sentences for already severely punished crimes say nothing about the significance of the existence of punishment as a deterring factor. These criminologists argue that the use of statistics to gauge the efficiency of crime fighting methods are a danger of creating a reward hack that makes the least efficient criminal justice systems appear to be best at fighting crime, and that the appearance of deterrence being ineffective may be an example of this. Imprisonment separates offenders from the community, for example, Australia was a dumping ground for early British criminals. This was their way of removing or reducing the offenders ability to carry out certain crimes. The death penalty does this in a permanent and irrevocable way. In some societies, people who stole have been punished by having their hands amputated.
Форма поиска
- Переводы пользователей
- Греция вводит уголовное наказание за распространение ложной информации о коронавирусе
- Определение
- Текст на английском с переводом для универа
Примеры употребления "punishment" в английском с переводом "наказание"
Новости ничего не объясняют Новости — как пузырьки на поверхности большого мира. Разве обработка несущественных фактов поможет вам понять мир? Чем больше фрагметов новостей вы поглотите, тем меньшую картину мира для себя составите. Если бы большее количество кусков информации приводило к экономическому успеху, то журналисты были бы на верху пирамиды. Но не в нашем случае. News is toxic to your body.
It constantly triggers the limbic system. Panicky stories spur the release of cascades of glucocorticoid cortisol. This deregulates your immune system and inhibits the release of growth hormones. In other words, your body finds itself in a state of chronic stress. High glucocorticoid levels cause impaired digestion, lack of growth cell, hair, bone , nervousness and susceptibility to infections.
The other potential side-effects include fear, aggression, tunnel-vision and desensitisation. Новости токсичны для вашего организма Они постоянно действуют на лимбическую систему. Панические истории стимулируют образование глюкокортикоидов кортизола. Это приводит в беспорядок вашу иммунную систему. Ваш организм оказывается в состоянии хронического стресса.
Другие возможные побочные эффекты включают страх, агрессию и потерю чувствительности, проблемы с ростом клеток волос, костей, неустойчивость к инфекциям. News increases cognitive errors. News feeds the mother of all cognitive errors: confirmation bias. In the words of Warren Buffett: «What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact. We become prone to overconfidence, take stupid risks and misjudge opportunities.
It also exacerbates another cognitive error: the story bias. Any journalist who writes, «The market moved because of X» or «the company went bankrupt because of Y» is an idiot. I am fed up with this cheap way of «explaining» the world. Новости искажают реальные факты усиливают ошибки восприятия Поток новостей — отец всех когнитивных ошибок: жажды подтверждения. Мы становимся излишне самоуверенными, глупо рискуем и недооцениваем возможности.
Наш мозг жаждет историй, которые «имеют смысл», даже если они не соответствуют действительности. Любой журналист, который пишет, что «рынок существует благодаря X» или «компания обанкротилась из-за Y», — идиот. Мы сыты по горло этим дешевым способом «объяснения» мира. News inhibits thinking. Thinking requires concentration.
Concentration requires uninterrupted time. News pieces are specifically engineered to interrupt you. They are like viruses that steal attention for their own purposes. News makes us shallow thinkers. News severely affects memory.
There are two types of memory. The path from short-term to long-term memory is a choke-point in the brain, but anything you want to understand must pass through it. If this passageway is disrupted, nothing gets through. Because news disrupts concentration, it weakens comprehension.
Оставьте меня в камере с этим животным и я покажу, каким может быть наказание. Наказание - 15 лет в федеральной тюрьме. The penalty for which is 15 years in a federal prison. Наказание - пять лет в федеральной тюрьме.
The penalty for which is five years in a federal prison. Они понесут наказание. И я также знаю, что ты сидишь тут передо мной только потому, что думаешь, что наказание, которое я могу назначить, не будет иметь значения. Напомните, каково наказание, если вас признают виновным в убийстве в вашей стране? Our brave and dutiful officials will quell the rebellion - Да там, в основном, отбывающие наказание впервые. Mostly first-time offenders. Они не впервые отбывают наказание. Первый же пропущенный рабочий день - и он начнет отбывать наказание в Синг-синг.
The first day of work he misses is the day he begins his sentence at sing sing. Это наказание. Оно повторяется. В наказание за то, что ты мне помогаешь, ты был отдан другому фею в собственность? So as punishment for helping me, you were given to another Fae as property? Они несут полную ответсвенность за меня, пока мое наказание не закончится.
His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch.
The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e.
See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism. For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s.
Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find. An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs.
Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986.
A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012. For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013.
One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion.
See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H. Morris 1981 and Hampton 1984; for a more recent account, see Demetriou 2012; for criticism, see Deigh 1984, Shafer-Landau 1991. But education theorists also take seriously the Hegelian worry discussed earlier; they view punishment not as a means of conditioning people to behave in certain ways, but rather as a means of teaching them that what they have done should not be done because it is morally wrong.
Thus although the education view sets offender reform as an end, it also implies certain nonconsequentialist constraints on how we may appropriately pursue this end. Another distinctive feature of the moral education view is that it conceives of punishment as aiming to confer a benefit on the offender: the benefit of moral education. Critics have objected to the moral education view on various grounds, however. Some are sceptical about whether punishment is the most effective means of moral education. Others deny that most offenders need moral education; many offenders realise what they are doing is wrong but are weak-willed, impulsive, etc. Each of the theories discussed in this section incorporates, in various ways, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements. Whether any of these is more plausible than pure consequentialist or pure retributivist alternatives is, not surprisingly, a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. One possibility, of course, is that none of the theories on offer is successful because punishment is, ultimately, unjustifiable.
The next section considers penal abolitionism. Abolition and Alternatives Abolitionist theorising about punishment takes many different forms, united only by the insistence that we should seek to abolish, rather than merely to reform, our practices of punishment. Classic abolitionist texts include Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994. An initial question is precisely what practices should be abolished. Some abolitionists focus on particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment see, e. Davis 2003. Insofar as such critiques are grounded in concerns about racial disparities, mass incarceration, police abuses, and other features of the U. At the same time, insofar as the critiques are based on particular features of the U.
By contrast, other abolitionist accounts focus not on some particular mode s of punishment, or on a particular mode of punishment as administered in this or that legal system, but rather on criminal punishment in any form see, e. The more powerful abolitionist challenge is that punishment cannot be justified even in principle. After all, when the state imposes punishment, it treats some people in ways that would typically outside the context of punishment be impermissible. It subjects them to intentionally burdensome treatment and to the condemnation of the community. Abolitionists find that the various attempted justifications of this intentionally burdensome condemnatory treatment fail, and thus that the practice is morally wrong — not merely in practice but in principle. For such accounts, a central question is how the state should respond to the types of conduct for which one currently would be subject to punishment. In this section we attend to three notable types of abolitionist theory and the alternatives to punishment that they endorse. But one might regard this as a false dichotomy see Allais 2011; Duff 2011a.
A restorative process that is to be appropriate to crime must therefore be one that seeks an adequate recognition, by the offender and by others, of the wrong done—a recognition that must for the offender, if genuine, be repentant; and that seeks an appropriate apologetic reparation for that wrong from the offender. But those are also the aims of punishment as a species of secular penance, as sketched above. A system of criminal punishment, however improved it might be, is of course not well designed to bring about the kind of personal reconciliations and transformations that advocates of restorative justice sometimes seek; but it could be apt to secure the kind of formal, ritualised reconciliation that is the most that a liberal state should try to secure between its citizens. If we focus only on imprisonment, which is still often the preferred mode of punishment in many penal systems, this suggestion will appear laughable; but if we think instead of punishments such as Community Service Orders now part of what is called Community Payback or probation, it might seem more plausible. This argument does not, of course, support that account of punishment against its critics. A similar issue is raised by the second kind of abolitionist theory that we should note here: the argument that we should replace punishment by a system of enforced restitution see e. For we need to ask what restitution can amount to, what it should involve, if it is to constitute restitution not merely for any harm that might have been caused, but for the wrong that was done; and it is tempting to answer that restitution for a wrong must involve the kind of apologetic moral reparation, expressing a remorseful recognition of the wrong, that communicative punishment on the view sketched above aims to become. More generally, advocates of restorative justice and of restitution are right to highlight the question of what offenders owe to those whom they have wronged — and to their fellow citizens see also Tadros 2011 for a focus on the duties that offenders incur.
Some penal theorists, however, especially those who connect punishment to apology, will reply that what offenders owe precisely includes accepting, undertaking, or undergoing punishment. A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result not of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment especially retributivist theories depend are misguided see s. As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021 instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines. Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s. International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law.
But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues. Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough.
We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010. For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims.
In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch. For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures.
We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim.
In some societies, people who stole have been punished by having their hands amputated.
Crewe [46] however, has pointed out that for incapacitation of an offender to work, it must be the case that the offender would have committed a crime had they not been restricted in this way. Should the putative offender not be going to commit further crimes, then they have not been incapacitated. The more heinous crimes such as murders have the lowest levels of recidivism and hence are the least likely offences to be subject to incapacitative effects.
Antisocial behaviour and the like display high levels of recidivism and hence are the kind of crimes most susceptible to incapacitative effects. It is shown by life-course studies [47] that long sentences for burglaries amongst offenders in their late teens and early twenties fail to incapacitate when the natural reduction in offending due to ageing is taken into account: the longer the sentence, in these cases, the less the incapacitative effect. Sometimes viewed as a way of "getting even" with a wrongdoer—the suffering of the wrongdoer is seen as a desired goal in itself, even if it has no restorative benefits for the victim.
One reason societies have administered punishments is to diminish the perceived need for retaliatory "street justice", blood feud , and vigilantism. Main article: Restorative justice Especially applied to minor offenses, punishment may take the form of the offender "righting the wrong", or making restitution to the victim. Community service or compensation orders are examples of this sort of penalty.
Punishment can serve as a means for society to publicly express denunciation of an action as being criminal.
Ищи #контент, который тебе нравится
- Другие топики по теме:
- → наказание, перевод на английский, примеры предложений | Glosbe
- Определение
- Google and Apple Settle Class-Action Lawsuit Alleging Wage Fixing | TIME
Penalty appeal eligibility
Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). Free essay examples about Death Penalty Proficient writing team High-quality of every essay Largest database of free samples on PapersOwl. Open access academic research from top universities on the subject of Criminal Law. Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Latest London news, business, sport, celebrity and entertainment from the London Evening Standard. Как "наказание" в английский: punishment, penalty, discipline. Контекстный перевод: Во многих странах строжайшая мера наказания — смертная казнь.
Наказание — перевод на английский
Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Аннотация. Цель данной статьи – выявить трудности перевода реалий профессий и должностей в романе Ф.М. Достоевского «Преступление и наказание» на английский язык. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Дисциплинарные органы Футбольной ассоциации Англии за период с 2011 года оштрафовали английских футболистов на 350 тысяч фунтов стерлингов за недопустимые сообщения в социальных
Penalty appeal eligibility
Подробная информация о сериале Как избежать наказания за убийство на сайте Кинопоиск. Перевод наказание по-английски. Как перевести на английский наказание? Перевод слова НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский язык, смотреть в русско-английском словаре. punishment, penalty, chastisement, judgment, discipline, penance, plague. criminal fine – уголовный штраф. / Перевод на английский "наказание".