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Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me.
If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not? The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc.
All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place.
Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now. For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires. Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world?
Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view. If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom.
Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations. And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us.
Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another.
But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire.
If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire. In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way. So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be.
Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing. Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way. Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control. To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us. But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity.
Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims. Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally. Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61. This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it. This is, naturally, a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know whether that maxim could also hold as a universal practical law.
I therefore apply the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could through my maxim at the same time give such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove has been made. I at once become aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that there would be no deposits at all. The issue is not whether it would be good if everyone acted on my maxim, or whether I would like it, but only whether it would be possible for my maxim to be willed as a universal law. This gets at the form, not the matter or content, of the maxim. A maxim has morally permissible form, for Kant, only if it could be willed as a universal law. If my maxim fails this test, as this one does, then it is morally impermissible for me to act on it. If my maxim passes the universal law test, then it is morally permissible for me to act on it, but I fully exercise my autonomy only if my fundamental reason for acting on this maxim is that it is morally permissible or required that I do so.
У издателя в то время были проблемы в связи с банкротством. Кант решил продолжить свою университетскую карьеру. Своё пробное сочинение для допуска на магистерский экзамен «Краткий очерк некоторых размышлений об огне», написанное на латыни, он представил 17 апреля 1755 года. Кант выступил на публичном экзамене и 12 июня получил титул магистра философии [60]. Обязательная публикация работы не требовалась, и она впервые была напечатана лишь в 1838 году с копии черновика и в 1839 году с оригинала текста, хранящегося в мемориальном отделе библиотеки Альбертины [61]. Учёное общество Кёнигсбергского университета хорошо приняло Канта и многое от него ожидало. Чтобы иметь возможность преподавать в университете, Канту пришлось написать ещё одну диссертацию, которая имела название «Каковы окончательные границы истины? В этой работе поднимались вопросы о том, что считать истинным, критиковались модели истинности Вольфа и Лейбница, дополнялся принцип достаточного основания [60]. Титульный лист немецкого издания «Всеобщей истории», 1755 Космогония[ править править код ] В изданной анонимно [62] в 1755 году книге «Всеобщая естественная история и теория небес» Кант отвечает на вопрос о происхождении Солнечной системы. Вероятно, источником вдохновения для написания труда послужил выпущенный в 1750 году труд Томаса Райта «Теория вселенной». Кант пытается объяснить происхождение закономерностей, по которым движутся тела в Солнечной системе, тем, что нет оснований полагать, что правила, по которым взаимодействуют небесные тела сейчас, действовали точно так же всегда. Кант заключает, что пространство, на месте которого ныне находится Солнечная система, могло быть заполнено частицами пыли различной плотности, после чего наиболее плотные частицы стали притягивать окружающие. Наряду с силой тяготения он вводит «силу отталкивания» между наиболее мелкими частицами, что объясняет, почему частицы не сложились в единое целое. Под постоянным действием сил притяжения и отталкивания объекты начали вращаться, и этот процесс занимал миллионы лет. Он также допускал возможность жизни и в других галактиках и считал, что у мира есть начало, но нет конца [63]. По Канту, Солнце начало нагреваться из-за трения между вращающимися массами материи [64]. Солнечная система продолжает развитие всё время и однажды все планеты и спутники «упадут» на Солнце, что вызовет увеличение его теплоты и расщепление тел на мелкие частицы. Туманности же, которые часто видны в телескоп, как считал Кант, являются такими же галактиками, как Млечный Путь , но они являются скоплениями более высокого порядка. Кант высказал предположение, что за Сатурном скрываются другие планеты, что было подтверждено через много лет [65]. Этот труд Канта не был математически точным, однако был опубликован по просьбам знакомых, которые полагали, что таким образом можно привлечь внимание короля и получить финансирование на подтверждение этой гипотезы, поэтому работа была посвящена Фридриху II. Произведение не вызвало ажиотажа: большая часть тиража была либо уничтожена ввиду банкротства издателя, либо продана лишь в 60-е годы. Вряд ли Фридрих II видел эту работу [63]. Уже после публикации произведения, в 1761 и 1796 годах, гипотеза Канта была независимо от первоисточника воспроизведена учёными Пьер-Симоном Лапласом и Иоганном Генрихом Ламбертом , не знавшими о своём предшественнике [66]. Преподавание[ править править код ] В 1755 году Кант становится преподавателем Кёнигсбергского университета, но не получает заработной платы. Он довольствуется гонорарами, получаемыми от студентов, посещающих его курсы. Таким образом, доход преподавателя определялся количеством студентов, записанных на лекции [67]. Свою первую публичную лекцию Кант дал в переполненном студентами доме профессора Кипке, где он в то время жил [68]. Занятия проводились в отдельных лекционных залах, которыми преподаватели либо владели, либо арендовали. Каждый преподаватель должен был строго следовать учебным пособиям, прилагаемым к университетской программе, однако сам Кант лишь соблюдал порядок тем, намеченных в учебниках, в то время как на лекциях давал студентам свой собственный материал. На лекциях философ часто демонстрировал так называемый «сухой юмор». Его редко видели улыбающимся, даже во время смеха аудитории от его собственных шуток. Людвиг Боровски, ученик и биограф Канта, отмечал, что Кант вёл свои занятия «свободно и остроумно», часто шутил, но «не позволял себе шуток с сексуальным подтекстом, которыми пользовались другие преподаватели». Своим ученикам преподаватель советовал «систематизировать свои знания у себя в голове под разными рубриками». С самого начала своей преподавательской деятельности Кант был весьма популярным лектором — его аудитории всегда были заполнены. В этот период Иммануил Кант интересовался этикой Фрэнсиса Хатчесона и философскими исследованиями Давида Юма , что во многом было продиктовано временем. Оба мыслителя были известны в те времена в столице. Со времён выпуска из гимназии богословие в его спектр интересов практически не попадало. Чтобы заработать на жизнь, Канту приходилось брать изнурительное количество занятий. Он преподавал математику и логику, физику и метафизику. В 1756 году он также добавил и географию, а следующем году — этику [ком. Университетские учебники имели пустые страницы, на которых Кант писал собственные заметки. Эти книги сохранились, что позволило исследователям лучше понимать генеалогию философии Канта. Он также носил с собой блокнот для записей. Первые два-три года преподавания были тяжелы для Канта. Он имел запас денег на крайний случай, но предпочитал при нужде продавать свои книги. Носил одежду до тех пор, пока она окончательно не обветшает. Позже его дела значительно улучшились, как признавался сам Кант, он зарабатывал «более, чем достаточно». Имел двухкомнатную квартиру, мог позволить себе хорошую еду, а также нанять прислугу, но его работа всегда была шаткой и его благосостояние зависело от его успешности как лектора. В 1756 году его место преподавателя логики и метафизики было занято Кнутценом. Не желая терять место, Кант даже написал письмо королю, в котором сообщил, что «философия является наиболее важной областью его интересов», однако не получил никакого ответа. Чтобы улучшить своё положение, он попытался устроиться в местную школу, однако вакантное место занял Вильгельм Канерт, являвшийся ярым пиетистом [ком. Скорее всего, Кант был отвергнут по религиозным причинам; впрочем, у его конкурента на должность имелся больший опыт преподавания. В конце 1750-х годов в Пруссии бушевала Семилетняя война. После сражения при Гросс-Егерсдорфе прусским войскам пришлось сдать город Кёнигсберг. В самом городе боевых действий не велось. Русские войска вошли в город 22 января 1758 года под командованием Виллима Фермора. Кёнигсберг был возвращён Пруссии в 1762 году по Петербургскому мирному договору , а до этого с самого начала присоединения к Российской империи российские офицеры посещали лекции в университете; Кант не сторонился их общества и даже проводил для них частные занятия.
И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками? Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Показать больше.
У него было немного друзей в жизни, но он очень любил собирать их в своём доме за обедом по выходным и вести долгие философские беседы - это страсть, которой он отдавался без остатка. И даже находясь при смерти, из-за прогрессирующего слабоумия, уже мало что соображая, он буквально преображался на глазах, когда приходившие его навестить ученики и коллеги заводили с ним беседы или диспуты на научные темы. Для нас, жителей России, особенно ценен тот факт в биографии Иммануила Канта, что четыре года он прожил под властью русской короны. Случилось это в разгар Семилетней войны, когда генерал Виллим Фермор занял Кёнигсберг. Положении для Пруссии было настолько серьёзным, что Фридрих Великий в отчаянии даже хотел отречься от престола. По взятии Кёнигсберга, как тогда и полагалось, население города привели к присяге русской императрице. Кант, как житель города, тоже тогда дал присягу и стал на несколько лет подданным Елизаветы Петровны. Русские офицеры и другие образованные люди, с удовольствием ходили в те года на лекции Канта, и брали у него частные уроки. А в 1762 году Иммануил Кант был избран членом Петербургской Академии наук. После его смерти, в 1804 году, философ был захоронен внутри Кафедрального собора, но потом тело эксгумировали и перенесли в специально построенный мавзолей на углу того же самого собора. При эксгумации был измерен его череп и обнаружено, что он был больше, чем у среднестатистического немецкого мужчины того времени, с "высоким и широким" лбом. При жизни многие его современники описывали его лицо, как лицо с большим лбом и "явно выступающим". Вот вкратце такой он был необыкновенный человек, Иммануил Кант. В день его трёхсотлетия, в городе для всех желающих свои двери открыл музей его имени в Кафедральном соборе, расположенном на острове, который тоже носит его имя.
Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе
Поэтому передо мной встала задача — изучить политическую мысль философа. Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение.
В третьем ответе кантовского чат-бота надежду чат-бот высказал относительно того, что будет развиваться, но уровня человеческого мышления не достигнет, но, на мой взгляд, это сомнительно. Мне кажется, что это вполне реально, и я, с одной стороны, боюсь, с другой — надеюсь застать это на своём веку. Ну и, конечно, последний вопрос: чем вообще является искусственный интеллект? Если по Канту, человек — это моральное существо, можем ли таким моральным существом считать искусственный интеллект?
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Проект направлен на развитие научно-экспертного и общественного диалога между странами большого Балтийско-Скандинавского региона: странами ЕС — с одной стороны и Россией и Белоруссией — с другой, с привлечением экспертов из других стран и регионов мира. Главная цель — возобновление научно-экспертного диалога по «второму треку» по широкому перечню тематик между российскими и европейскими учеными: от социальных, экономических, экологических, культурных до проблем военной и невоенной безопасности. Комментарии 0.
Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.
Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. В 2008 году режиссёр получил "Золотую пальмовую ветвь" за картину "Класс", снятую по роману Франсуа Бегодо "Между стен" о жизни учителя одной из школ Парижа.
How is autonomous action possible? How is a perception of beauty possible? How are living creatures possible?
На конгрессе доктор Штайн представил доклад «Фундаментальная важность Канта для физики XXI века», который также вызвал большой интерес у участников дискуссии из разных стран. В молодости он изучал Ньютона и Лейбница. Так что он был знаком со всеми физическими понятиями, — рассказал доктор Штайн. Поэтому философия не должна быть чем-то вроде витания в воздухе без связи с реальным миром. А физика не должна просто что-то делать, не думая об этом.
Специальная сессия «Наследие Иммануила Канта для современных международных отношений» в Калининграде 231 23 апреля 2024 г. Канта при участии Института Европы РАН — провели специальную научно-экспертную сессию «Наследие Иммануила Канта для современных международных отношений». В ходе мероприятия участники рассмотрели широкий спектр проблем теории и практики современных международных отношений и безопасности через призму политической и международно-правовой мысли выдающегося философа. В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития.
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С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. Читайте последние новости на тему в ленте новостей на сайте РИА Новости. Смотрите 57 фотографии онлайн по теме кант мемы. With an eye to Kant’s work, a philosopher and a sociologist argue that the Uber project robs drivers of their dignity. Immanuel Kant Idealism. The inscrutable wisdom [of God] through which we exist is not less worthy of veneration in respect to what it denies us than in respect to what it has granted. See an archive of all immanuel kant stories published on the New York Media network, which includes NYMag, The Cut, Vulture, and Grub Street.
Emmanuel Kant
Женщин же он считал существами, не способными логически мыслить. Рецепт один — отойти в сторону, чтобы не заразиться. Был момент, когда Кант в Кенигсберге оказался практически рок-звездой. Его работы мало кто мог прочесть и осмыслить, но это добавляло загадочности персонажу. В городе его знали все, и все делали вид, что понимают хоть что-нибудь. С другой стороны, если уж Генрих Гейне, которому было семь лет, когда Кант умер, так сильно спустя годы реагировал на упоминание философских трудов чудака из Кенигсберга не любил Гейне «Критику чистого разума», что тут поделаешь? График не на фиг Он был узнаваем. Человек, ненавидевший дневник в гимназии и самокопание, придумал для себя график. График, практически исключавший вмешательства извне.
Как ни странно, этот график как раз извне был особенно интересен: выход из дома в определенный час на прогулку по определенному маршруту. Те, кто в дом были вхожи, знали и другие правила. В пять утра встать после семичасового сна, надеть колпак, а сверху — маленькую треугольную шляпу. Работать до семи в кабинете. Прочитать лекцию. Без пятнадцати час начать одеваться к обеду, пообедать и пойти на прогулку. Его прогулки стали настолько известными, что на пути Канта стали караулить местные попрошайки. На прогулках он дышал носом.
Считал, что это правило гигиены. Что же касается обеда, то это был единственный прием пищи, с тремя блюдами. В остальное время был слабый чай, а за обедом — полбутылки французского вина философ предпочитал медок. Пива не любил. Часто приглашал друзей, но при условии, что за едой никто не будет говорить о философии. Сам страдал, когда видел, что кому-то может быть нанесен вред. Одна история: слуга разбил бокал во время обеда. Осколки стали настоящей проблемой: Кант боялся за гостей, за слугу, и начал сам собирать осколки.
Go to first Feb 5th, 2016 Was Kant somehow responsible for the rise of Nazism? Smith explores two points of view on this issue. George H. Smith George H. I do not believe that the great clock of the cathedral there did its daily work more dispassionately and regularly than to its compatriot Immanuel Kant. More serious and more fundamental is the method Peikoff used to link Kant to Nazism. Hayek have regarded themselves as Kantians.
Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life. Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based. Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws. Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God. In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me. If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not? The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now.
On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses. He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life. Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based. Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws. Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid. Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God. In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong.
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С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. Эммануэль (а именно такое имя при рождении получил будущий гений философии) Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кёнигсберге в семье шорника – мастера по изготовлению. The governor of Kaliningrad, Anton Alikhanov, said Friday that Immanuel Kant is responsible for the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Emmanuel Kant. Emmanuel Kant. Follow new publications.
Лауреат Каннского кинофестиваля, французский режиссёр Лоран Канте умер в 63 года
Neither stars nor even galaxies would survive a disaster like this. If the second hypothesis is correct and dark energy is really a quintessence, then the future may hold a lot of amazing and unpleasant surprises. Story Saved You can find this story in My Bookmarks.
Клуб представляет бельгийскую провинцию Люксембург и проводит матчи на четырехтысячном стадионе «Иван Жорж». Клуб никогда не играл в высшем бельгийском дивизионе. Ранее стало известно, что Канте переходит в «Аль-Иттихад» на правах свободного агента.
В саудовском клубе он будет одноклубником бывшего нападающего мадридского «Реала» Карима Бензема.
Вот правда, скажи мне кто-нибудь ещё каких-то пять лет назад, что вскоре моя жизнь повернётся так, что я буду точно знать когда родился немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения Иммануил Кант - не поверила бы! Ну то есть представление имела о человеке, жившем 300лет тому назад, но чтоб вот так... День рождения... А вот поди ж ты!... А вы знаете кто такой И. Ну то есть, если вы живёте в Калининграде или области, то само собой точно имеете представление об этом человеке - кто он, что и как. Ведь как-никак, а Кант родился в Кёнигсберге, его жизнь и становление как мыслителя эпохи прошло именно здесь. А вот если вы живёте в другой местности, то у вас, вероятнее всего, есть свои герои, знаменитые земляки, то всё у вас весьма смутно в отношении его биографии, скорее всего. Ну а для Калининграда Кант уже давно стал что называется, лицом города.
Множественная и разнообразная туристическая атрибутика - магнитики, статуэтки, открытки с его изображением и цитатами буквально заполонила сувенирные лавки города. Это время вошло в историю как эпоха Просвещения и Кант был одним из самых интеллектуально одарённых людей того времени. Последующие поколения философов черпали и черпают по сей день идеи из трудов мыслителей эпохи Просвещения, в частности, из идей и трудов Иммануила Канта. Эммануэль Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кёнигсберге, в лютеранской семье не очень богатой, но порядочной и благочестивой. Он был крещён, но позже изменил написание своего имени на Иммануил после того, как стал изучать иврит.
На этом его многолетняя эпопея с учёбой завершилась, но, по правилам того времени, чтобы быть допущенным к преподаванию в университете, ему нужно было создать ещё один научный труд, и для него Кант избрал довольно сложную философическую тему, которая и сейчас не имела бы проблем с обоснованием актуальности научной проблематики — «Каковы окончательные границы истины? Интересно, что, став преподавателем, он не получал от университета заработной платы, лишь гонорары от студентов.
Впрочем, с последним проблем у него не было — Кант от природы оказался наделён способностями лектора. Умея доступно объяснять сложные вещи, систематизировать подаваемый материал, одарённый изящным чувством юмора, он быстро стал пользоваться популярностью, и на его лекциях, особенно публичных, всегда были аншлаги. Гонорары, правда, были не очень большими, и Канту, помимо философии, пришлось навесить на себя также логику, математику, физику, метафизику, географию, этику — уже хотя бы это позволяет понять, каким разносторонним был Иммануил Кант, чьи реальные заслуги перед наукой до известной степени даже выходят за рамки чистой философии. Периодически Канта «подсиживали» на преподавательских должностях, из-за чего он даже пытался жаловаться прусскому королю Фридриху II. Вообще, несмотря на периодические финансовые подарки судьбы, он всю жизнь страдал от нехватки средств, и, скорее всего, потому так и не обзавёлся семьёй — боялся, что не сможет содержать её. В нашей стране довольно широко известен тот факт, что четыре года Кант прожил под властью русской короны. Случилось это в разгар Семилетней войны.
Русская армия, одержав блистательную победу в Гросс-Егерсдорфском сражении, погнала прусские войска на запад, и генерал Виллим Фермор занял Кёнигсберг. Положение для Пруссии тогда было угрожающее, скоро русская армия займёт Берлин, а Фридрих Великий в отчаянии даже хотел отречься от престола. По существовавшей тогда традиции, население города привели к присяге русской императрице, присягу дал тогда и Кант, ставший на несколько лет русским подданным. И если бы не смерть Елизаветы Петровны и не воцарение Петра III, может, и древний славянский Кролевец, превратившийся со временем в Кёнигсберг, стал бы частью русского государства ещё тогда. Русские офицеры, образованные люди, с удовольствием ходили на лекции Канта, и даже брали у него частные уроки. А в 1762 году философа избрали членом Петербургской Академии наук. Философ и мыслитель В тот период Кант был столь загружен, что ему некогда было заниматься собственно наукой.
До 1762 года, когда Кёнигсберг вновь попал под власть Берлина, вышло лишь одно его небольшое эссе. Зато как раз в том году он публикует свой известный труд «Ложное мудрствование в четырёх фигурах силлогизма», а в 1763 году продолжил развитие высказанных идей в своей следующей работе «Опыт введения в философию понятия отрицательных величин». Это одно из самых известных его произведений, своеобразное исследование противоположностей и суждений. Тогда же обозначились его стремления создать и сформулировать свою собственную теорию познания. Но путь к своей теории занял у Канта десятки лет. Сам он формулировал её как смычку трёх элементов — метафизики, морали и религии. Соответственно, Кант рассматривал их как совокупность вопросов, соответственно каждому элементу это: «Что я могу знать?
Высшей же точкой своей модели он видел антропологию, которая должна была отвечать на вопрос «Что такое человек? Пик творчества Канта — это его зрелость, 1780-е годы. Именно тогда вышли самые знаменитые его работы, которые и по сей день являются одними из фундаментальных работ мировой философской мысли. В 1781 году выходит «Критика чистого разума» Кант попытался осмыслить возможности познания, в первую очередь эмпирическим путём. Как известно, данный путь познания, предполагающий практические опыты и исследования, является основополагающим в науке и по сей день, а заложенные Кантом мысли, творчески развитые и обогащённые последующими поколениями философов, имеют хождение не только в гуманитарных, но и в точных науках, и по сей день. Такие понятия, как «вещь себе», субъективность пространства и времени, подчинение бытия человеческой мысли и по сей день являются важнейшими постулатами в философии. В продолжение своего трактата в 1788 году Кант выпускает «Критику практического разума».
Каждому, кто изучал в университете философию, известно о разделении учёным разума на теоретический и практический, о необходимости сдерживать теорию при доброкачественной культивации практики.
Иммануил Кант
В бюллетенях голосования "Великие имена России", раздаваемых в самолётах, немецкого философа Иммануила Канта называют "Эммануилом". Settings and more. Buffering. Emmanuelle Kant (Original Mix) (our 2nd recordeal!) BESTINSPACE ™. Сам Иммануил Кант был увлеченным своим делом ученым, талантливым преподавателем и эксцентричным, но при этом общительным человеком.
«Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
Когда принималось решение широко отметить 300-летие немецкого философа Иммануила Канта, необходимость интеграции отечественной гуманитарной науки с мировой еще не. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Биография немецкого философа Иммануила Канта: личная жизнь, присяга Российской империи, университет его имени, могила в Калининграде. Последние дни Иммануила Канта: Directed by Philippe Collin.