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Перевод "наказание" на английский
Those are mitigating circumstances. Under influence, kind of things. But under influence of what? So in this case, you were not under influence of alcohol or drugs. Nothing like that. You were just in shock. Oh, okay. So maybe like some kind of mental. Mental breakdown. So when we give our definitions. Double check them on Google because you have English and then you have legal English, which is kind of different things.
And also laws change as well. And definitions as well can change sometimes. So you said you have constitution. So Turkey has a constitution that is written and... And if you are against that, you will be punished according to that. For example, like burning the flag. It is a crime in the US as well. A lot of things are crime in Russia. I want to comment on this. Because this was like, that was a really pushed during the Vietnam War was can we burn the flag can we wear the flag as clothing.
Because it used to be against the law to if a flag, an American flag purposely or accidentally was dropped to the ground, if it touched the ground, you have to burn it out of a ceremony to show respect to the flag or you were not allowed, it was against the law to wear the American flag as clothing. It was against that law. And underwear. Same in Turkey. Underwear short, anything. So funny. I have pajamas with the American flag. But in the end Vietnam War came with all of the riots and rebellion and anti-war. And this kind of thing changed it. So you have, so Turkey has a written constitution.
Of course, Russia has a written and of course, America, the UK does not have a written constitution. Oh, right. Which is really interesting. This is old historical structure. Maybe it does exist. I believe there is a Bill of Rights, or at least there is discussion about introducing it in the UK. So our founding fathers knew this. So they put very general things. And so, of course, as time changes and people change, conditions change. You have to interpret it or misinterpret it.
And do they still wear the wigs? They do, they do. I love these wigs. So actually like in the movies and everithing? I mean, it is so crazy to watch the British in court fighting each other or not in court, in the parliament, I should say. In the parliament. Not in America. The House of Parliament is a very rowdy parliament. Yeah, rowdy is a great word. It is fun to watch.
And very noisy. They insult each other. They get emotional. And they boo and make noise. A lot of parliaments do have... But some parliaments people get physical. Well, of course, you have the famous video of Жириновский throwing water at people. That was so fun. Did you see that video? He had a disagreement with another person and he threw water.
Yeah, it was probably over the retaking of Alaska. Yeah, but that was funny. It was quite the scene. So why do people commit crimes?
Were you aware that whitey served some time At the state pen ranch? Почти никто не получает наказание. Almost nobody gets punished. Сэр, я не сделала ничего, что могло бы повлечь за собой такое наказание. Sir, I have done nothing to warrant this type of punishment. Это твое наказание. Поэтому, самое суровое наказание не только оправдано, но и заслуженно ". Моё заслуженное наказание? Она будет найдена, и она понесёт наказание. She will be found, and she will be punished. Да, этот ребёнок сущее наказание. Oh, yeah. Я понёс наказание. Нет никаких данных о том, что им было назначено наказание. Теперь, если ты собираешься отбыть наказание, тебе предстоит отмыть эту стену от граффити. Now, if you wish to perform the sanctions, your first act will be cleaning the graffiti off this wall. Я приму наказание. Нужно хотя бы какое-нибудь наказание.
Это же касается обсуждения обязательного характера вакцинации от коронавируса. Фото: Pixabay.
Некоторые виды преступлений стары, как само человеческое общество такие как воровство, карманная кража, вандализм, разбой и домашнее насилие, умышленное и непредумышленное убийство , другие виды стали более недавним явлением. Вооруженное ограбление магазинов и банков, взлом компьютеров так называемый «кибер-криминал» , коррупция или подделка банкнот и документов, к примеру, являются некоторыми из них. Статистика показывает тревожный рост жестоких преступлений и криминала, связанного с незаконной продажей оружия по всему миру. К сожалению, часто женщины и дети становятся жертвами криминала. Иногда преступники похищают богатых людей или их детей и требуют за них выкуп. Помимо жестоких преступлений, в нашем современном обществе существуют так называемые должностные преступления. Это мошеннические действия, когда человеку не угрожают физически и не причиняют боль. Среди них — уклонение от налогов когда люди обвиняются в преднамеренной неуплате налогов , взяточничество, хищение персональных данных когда преступник похищает личную информацию другого человека с целью использования его кредитных карт или банковских счетов, к примеру.
Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?
Breaking headlines and latest news from the US and the World. Exclusives, live updates, pictures, video and comment from The Sun. "Deuspi" is a silent film without any language spoken, so we will be exploiting the visuals in this lesson by getting students to create their original sentences in English to describe what they. Как на английском сленге будет "смертник" (в смысле приговоренный к смертной казни)? английский язык онлайн. View CNN world news today for international news and videos from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas.
Перевод "наказание" на английский
Three Volumes: In Which Are Explain'd the Laws and Claims of Nature and Nations, and the Principal Points That Relate Either to Publick Government, or the Conduct of Private Life: Together with the Author's Own Notes: Done into English by Several Hands. Суд может наложить штраф. Смело включайте детективы в оригинале и наслаждайтесь! ❣ Привет, ребят! 👉 В прошлый раз мы разобрали различные преступления на английском, а теперь. Преступления и наказания на английском языке. Работа с лексикой. Английский язык, Презентации, 11 класс, Crimes. criminal fine – уголовный штраф. "Deuspi" is a silent film without any language spoken, so we will be exploiting the visuals in this lesson by getting students to create their original sentences in English to describe what they.
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
The book was written in 1865 — 1866. Читайте лучшие произведения русской и мировой литературы полностью онлайн бесплатно и без регистрации, без сокращений. Бесплатное чтение книг. Книги — корабли мысли, странствующие по волнам времени и бережно несущие свой драгоценный груз от поколения к поколению.
Заслужить наказание. Подвергнуться наказанию за что… … Толковый словарь Ушакова наказание — телесное, строгое, легкое, исправительное, уголовное , взыскание, кара, казнь, пеня, расправа, штраф, эпитимия. Ср … Словарь синонимов Наказание — Любая реакция, следующая за определенным событием и уменыпающая вероятность возникновения этого события в будущем. К примеру, если ребенка бранят каждый раз, когда он кормит собаку едой со стола, то в конце концов он прекратит это делать. Александр Пушкин Кто жалеет розги своей, тот ненавидит сына; а кто любит, тот с детства наказывает его. Царь Соломон Притчи, 13, 24 В книге Бытия немало примеров наказания тех, кто ослушался… … Сводная энциклопедия афоризмов НАКАЗАНИЕ — punishment Преднамеренное нанесение ущерба субъекту уполномоченными на то лицами, являющееся результатом нарушения им правил, соблюдение которых от него требуют и за нарушение которых он считается ответственным.
Они используются с намерением либо заставить его сознаться в своем преступлении, или объяснить какое-то противоречие, в ходе его рассмотрения, или открыть его сообщников, или для какого-то метафизического и непонятного очищения от позора, или, наконец, для того, чтобы обнаружить и другие преступления, по которым его не обвиняли, но в которых он может быть виновным. Ни один человек не может быть осужденным, пока он не был признан виновным, и не может общество забрать у него защиту, пока не было доказано, что он нарушил условия, на которых она была предоставлена. С точки зрения закона, каждый человек невиновен, пока преступление не было доказано. Преступления более действенно предотвратить, чем быть уверенным в строгости наказания. В той же мере как наказания становились более жестокими, сознание людей ставало более закаленными и бесчувственным.
Вся жесткость является лишней и, следовательно, тиранической. Смертная казнь является пагубной для общества, она дает пример варварства. Если страсти, или необходимость войны, учит людей проливать кровь ближних, законы, которые призваны смягчить жестокость человечества, не должны увеличить его на примерах жестокости, тем более ужасно, что этот вид наказания, как правило, сопряжен с официальными зрелищами. Разве это не абсурдно, что законы, которые ненавидят и наказывают за убийство, должны, с тем чтобы предотвратить убийства, публично взять на себя убийство?
We have to set laws. So, yeah, a crime is an action that breaks a certain law. But then again, in this case, we have two terms because we have a crime and we have misdemeanor. Is it also a crime? In America, yeah, in America you have felonies and misdemeanors. So these are degrees of seriousness of crimes.
It is still a crime. Varya, what is considered a misdemeanor crime in America? Well, there are many types of felony crimes that could be murder, it could be... Murder is a felony? Yeah, it is a felony crime, yeah. I thought a felony somewhere, you know, in the mid. Like, not. Not so serious. Well, in Russian you have administrative crimes. I guess you can translate heavy crimes.
So misdemeanor crimes are things like jaywalking. So I was going to ask. What about..? Petty theft. Petty theft or... Some misdemeanors can be stronger than others. So it just depends on state by state with that. Of course, in America, you have the federal level and the state level, and it depends what crime you commit. Whereas if you commit a crime on the territory of a state, yeah. And then the crimes, the criminals would be treated differently depending on the state.
Or even we have privatized prisons where someone actually owns prison. Same in England. Which people can make money off from criminals. This company called G4S. But then there are things that are not on the law books yet. Or not standardized. Domestic violence, animal abuse. I mean, a lot of women did not speak out against their husbands because there was no law. So there are kind of. But but then through activism, we could change laws.
And the job of the police, of course, is to enforce the law. Enforce means to make sure that the laws are followed and to apply punishments if required. Of course. But I mean, to detain, excuse me, to detain someone, not to punish people. Yeah, to detain people if required. So, Ugur, what in Turkey? Do you have, like a similar system to America whereby you have misdemeanor crimes and felony crimes? Plus we have constitutional crimes. And you need to be just, you need to be in a state that you have to take the constitutional law and court house. Kind of felony.
So, same thing. Like a similar thing. Well, even the different levels of murder we would have, what is a first degree murder... Second degree. If you really had a plan to do it. Yeah, premeditated. That would be the highest. The passion and a be lesser degree. Wife kills the husband. Under the influence, the passion.
Because there is certain... Oh, affect that sounds like, yeah, alcohol. So in this, well, in Russian, for example, we have this sort of, okay, help me out with the term. So there is mitigating, you know, some sort of conditions which make the punishment harder. What is the opposite to that something that makes the punishment less severe? Well, mitigating circumstances. Oh, mitigating is something that helps you to get... Without an action you mean. Those are mitigating circumstances.
Стала известна возможная мера наказания английскому вандалу
Русско-английский и англо-русский юридический онлайн-словарь. Русско-английский и англо-русский юридический онлайн-словарь. Breaking headlines and latest news from the US and the World. Exclusives, live updates, pictures, video and comment from The Sun. Перевод наказание по-английски. Как перевести на английский наказание?
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When the officers at the bureau begin talking about the murder, Raskolnikov faints. He quickly recovers, but he can see from their faces that he has aroused suspicion. Without knowing why, he visits his old university friend Razumikhin, who observes that Raskolnikov seems to be seriously ill. Finally he returns to his room where he succumbs to his illness and falls into a prolonged delirium. When he emerges several days later he finds that Razumikhin has tracked him down and has been nursing him. He angrily tells the others to leave as well, and then sneaks out himself.
He looks for news about the murder, and seems almost to want to draw attention to his own part in it. He returns to the scene of the crime and re-lives the sensations he experienced at the time. He angers the workmen and caretakers by asking casual questions about the murder, even suggesting that they accompany him to the police station to discuss it. As he contemplates whether or not to confess, he sees Marmeladov, who has been struck mortally by a carriage. Upon entering his room Raskolnikov is deeply shocked to see his mother and sister sitting on the sofa.
They have just arrived in Petersburg and are ecstatic to see him, but Raskolnikov is unable to speak, and collapses in a faint. Part 3 edit Razumikhin tends to Raskolnikov, and manages to convince the distressed mother and sister to return to their apartment. When they return the next morning Raskolnikov has improved physically, but it becomes apparent that he is still mentally distracted and merely forcing himself to endure the meeting. He demands that Dunya break with Luzhin, but Dunya fiercely defends her motives for the marriage. Mrs Raskolnikova has received a note from Luzhin demanding that her son not be present at any future meetings between them.
He also informs her that he witnessed her son give the 25 rubles to "an unmarried woman of immoral behavior" Sonya. Dunya has decided that a meeting, at which both Luzhin and her brother are present, must take place, and Raskolnikov agrees to attend that evening along with Razumikhin. As she leaves, Raskolnikov asks for her address and tells her that he will visit her soon. Raskolnikov immediately senses that Porfiry knows that he is the murderer. Porfiry, who has just been discussing the case with Zamyotov, adopts an ironic tone during the conversation.
An appointment is made for an interview the following morning at the police bureau. Leaving Razumikhin with his mother and sister, Raskolnikov returns to his own building. Raskolnikov tries to find out what he wants, but the artisan says only one word — "murderer", and walks off. Petrified, Raskolnikov returns to his room and falls into thought and then sleep. He wakens from an eerie nightmare about the murder of the old woman to find another complete stranger present, this time a man of aristocratic appearance.
The fear of death is more effective than the fear of prison. If we put them in prison, they can escape and commit another crime. It is cruel and inhumane. People have been sentenced to death and later it was discovered that they were completely innocent. The poor and defenceless are more likely to be executed than the rich and powerful.
And what do you think about it? From Speak Out 4, 1998 Смертная казнь В демократических странах существуют споры: как общество должно наказывать убийц? Или террористов? Или похитителей? В некоторых странах смертная казнь была отменена.
Но она все еще используется в других.
An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s.
The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid.
Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012. For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense.
This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch.
For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H. Morris 1981 and Hampton 1984; for a more recent account, see Demetriou 2012; for criticism, see Deigh 1984, Shafer-Landau 1991. But education theorists also take seriously the Hegelian worry discussed earlier; they view punishment not as a means of conditioning people to behave in certain ways, but rather as a means of teaching them that what they have done should not be done because it is morally wrong. Thus although the education view sets offender reform as an end, it also implies certain nonconsequentialist constraints on how we may appropriately pursue this end. Another distinctive feature of the moral education view is that it conceives of punishment as aiming to confer a benefit on the offender: the benefit of moral education. Critics have objected to the moral education view on various grounds, however.
Some are sceptical about whether punishment is the most effective means of moral education. Others deny that most offenders need moral education; many offenders realise what they are doing is wrong but are weak-willed, impulsive, etc. Each of the theories discussed in this section incorporates, in various ways, consequentialist and nonconsequentialist elements. Whether any of these is more plausible than pure consequentialist or pure retributivist alternatives is, not surprisingly, a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. One possibility, of course, is that none of the theories on offer is successful because punishment is, ultimately, unjustifiable. The next section considers penal abolitionism. Abolition and Alternatives Abolitionist theorising about punishment takes many different forms, united only by the insistence that we should seek to abolish, rather than merely to reform, our practices of punishment. Classic abolitionist texts include Christie 1977, 1981; Hulsman 1986, 1991; de Haan 1990; Bianchi 1994.
An initial question is precisely what practices should be abolished. Some abolitionists focus on particular modes of punishment, such as capital punishment see, e. Davis 2003. Insofar as such critiques are grounded in concerns about racial disparities, mass incarceration, police abuses, and other features of the U. At the same time, insofar as the critiques are based on particular features of the U. By contrast, other abolitionist accounts focus not on some particular mode s of punishment, or on a particular mode of punishment as administered in this or that legal system, but rather on criminal punishment in any form see, e. The more powerful abolitionist challenge is that punishment cannot be justified even in principle. After all, when the state imposes punishment, it treats some people in ways that would typically outside the context of punishment be impermissible.
It subjects them to intentionally burdensome treatment and to the condemnation of the community. Abolitionists find that the various attempted justifications of this intentionally burdensome condemnatory treatment fail, and thus that the practice is morally wrong — not merely in practice but in principle. For such accounts, a central question is how the state should respond to the types of conduct for which one currently would be subject to punishment. In this section we attend to three notable types of abolitionist theory and the alternatives to punishment that they endorse. But one might regard this as a false dichotomy see Allais 2011; Duff 2011a. A restorative process that is to be appropriate to crime must therefore be one that seeks an adequate recognition, by the offender and by others, of the wrong done—a recognition that must for the offender, if genuine, be repentant; and that seeks an appropriate apologetic reparation for that wrong from the offender. But those are also the aims of punishment as a species of secular penance, as sketched above. A system of criminal punishment, however improved it might be, is of course not well designed to bring about the kind of personal reconciliations and transformations that advocates of restorative justice sometimes seek; but it could be apt to secure the kind of formal, ritualised reconciliation that is the most that a liberal state should try to secure between its citizens.
If we focus only on imprisonment, which is still often the preferred mode of punishment in many penal systems, this suggestion will appear laughable; but if we think instead of punishments such as Community Service Orders now part of what is called Community Payback or probation, it might seem more plausible. This argument does not, of course, support that account of punishment against its critics. A similar issue is raised by the second kind of abolitionist theory that we should note here: the argument that we should replace punishment by a system of enforced restitution see e. For we need to ask what restitution can amount to, what it should involve, if it is to constitute restitution not merely for any harm that might have been caused, but for the wrong that was done; and it is tempting to answer that restitution for a wrong must involve the kind of apologetic moral reparation, expressing a remorseful recognition of the wrong, that communicative punishment on the view sketched above aims to become. More generally, advocates of restorative justice and of restitution are right to highlight the question of what offenders owe to those whom they have wronged — and to their fellow citizens see also Tadros 2011 for a focus on the duties that offenders incur. Some penal theorists, however, especially those who connect punishment to apology, will reply that what offenders owe precisely includes accepting, undertaking, or undergoing punishment. A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result not of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment especially retributivist theories depend are misguided see s. As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021 instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines.
Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s. International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law. But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues.
Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010. For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W.
Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch.
For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e.
In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories. There are also widely documented burdensome consequences of a conviction to the family members or loved ones of those who are convicted, and to their communities. These sorts of informal consequences of criminal convictions appear less likely than the formal legal consequences to constitute legal punishment, insofar as they are not intentionally imposed by the state but see Kolber 2012. Still, the informal collateral consequences of a conviction are arguably relevant to theorising about punishment, and we should examine when, if ever, such burdens are relevant to sentencing determinations on sentencing, see s. Further Issues A number of further important questions are relevant to theorising about punishment, which can only be noted here. First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries?
What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence? Considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to these questions see e. Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice — between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified — that the abolitionist challenge can be met. It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect — that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified see Heffernan and Kleinig 2000. If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, while also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices that perpetrate serious injustice see Murphy 1973; Duff 2001, ch.
Finally, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual system of punishment unjust ified might be not its own operations as such what punishment is or achieves within that system , but the absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the whole system depends for its legitimacy see Duff 2001, ch. Recent scholarship on punishment has increasingly acknowledged that the justification of punishment depends on the justification of the criminal law more generally, and indeed the legitimacy of the state itself see s. For example, if the state passes laws criminalising conduct that is not justifiably prohibited, then this calls into question the justification of the punishment it imposes for violations of these laws. Similarly, if the procedures by which criminal justice officials apprehend, charge, and prosecute individuals are unjustified, then the subsequent inflictions of punishment will be unjustified as well see Ristroph 2015 and 2016; on specific aspects of criminal procedure, see, e.
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Русско-английский и англо-русский юридический онлайн-словарь. Top stories in the U.S. and world news, politics, health, science, business, music, arts and culture. Nonprofit journalism with a mission. This is NPR. 43-летняя супермодель проявила эмоции на публике в Майами. Жизель Бюндхен не смогла сдержать слез, получив штраф от полицейского. criminal fine – уголовный штраф. английский язык онлайн. Русско-английский словарь. Перевод «Наказание». на английский язык: «punishment».